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THE OTHER PATENT AGENCY: CONGRESSIONAL 




The United States International Trade Commission has recently 
experienced a dramatic increase in patent infringement investigations 
under § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. In fact, the number of patent 
enforcement actions submitted to the ITC has nearly doubled in the last 
five years. Patent holders are selecting this forum because of its speedy 
proceedings and its ability to award broad exclusion orders. This rise in 
ITC patent litigation, however, has revealed weaknesses in the structure 
of § 337. In broadening the provision to facilitate the enforcement of 
patent rights, Congress failed to consider the impact of this change on 
technological innovation and on the coherence of the patent system. In 
particular, Congress did not clarify the relationship between § 337 and 
the Patent Act, thereby jeopardizing the uniformity of the patent system. 
Nor did it consider the effect that patent-related exclusion orders would 
have on innovation and on strategic behavior. This Article recommends 
that Congress harmonize ITC patent law with the Patent Act and related 
federal precedent, or alternatively, abolish § 337. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Technological innovation serves as the foundation of the patent 
system. The government grants inventors a limited monopoly right, in 
the form of a patent, to foster innovation. Doing so supports the U.S. 
economy and improves the public’s quality of life.1 Charged by Article 
1, § 8 of the Constitution with promoting “the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts,”2 Congress bears the burden of regulating patent law. 
The Supreme Court has held that Congress cannot “enlarge the patent 
monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement or social 
benefit gained thereby,” as these factors “are inherent requisites in a 
patent system.”3 “This is the standard expressed in the Constitution and 
it may not be ignored.”4 
Much attention has been paid to how Congress has adhered to—or 
failed to adhere to—this standard in regulating patents. Commentators 
have debated how to promote innovation through reform of the Patent 
Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.5 Others have focused on the relationship 
between innovation and Congress’s regulation of the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office.6 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1 (2003) [hereinafter FTC REPORT], available at 
http://www.promotetheprogress.com/ptpfiles/patentreform/misc/FTCreport.pdf (“Innovation 
benefits consumers through the development of new and improved goods, services, and 
processes. An economy’s capacity for invention and innovation helps drive its economic growth 
and the degree to which standards of living increase. Technological breakthroughs . . . illustrate 
the power of innovation to increase prosperity and improve the quality of our lives.” (footnote 
omitted)); Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural 
Perspective, (Duke Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Paper No. 218; Duke Sci., Tech. & 
Innovation Paper No. 29, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1259850 (“Both theory 
and empirics support the primacy of technological innovation in securing long-term economic 
growth and, ultimately, human welfare.”); Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Attorney Gen., 
Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Presentation at the 11th Annual Symposium on Antitrust: 
Maximizing Welfare Through Technological Innovation 9 (Oct. 31, 2007), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/227291.pdf (“In other words, improvements in 
technology—new ways of producing, rather than just old methods done more intensely—create 
the vast majority of improvement in real societal wealth.”). See generally COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (Benn Steil et al. eds., 
2002) (analyzing the relationship between technological innovation and economic 
performance). 
 2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 3. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966). 
 4. Id.  
 5. See, e.g., WENDY H. SCHACT &  JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PATENT 
REFORM: INNOVATION ISSUES (2005), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32996_2005 
0715.pdf; James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure 235–60 (Princeton U. Press 2008). 
 6. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to 
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This debate has overlooked how Congress’s regulation of the U.S. 
International Trade Commission (ITC) through § 337 of the Tariff Act 
of 19307 affects the patent system and whether § 337 promotes the goals 
of Article 1, § 8 of the Constitution. The ITC has become a popular 
forum for enforcing patents, with the number of actions increasing by 
nearly 80% since 2003.8 Patent holders utilize the ITC because of the 
availability of powerful exclusion orders, which block the importation 
of infringing products.9 Although § 337 was not historically used for 
enforcing intellectual property (IP) rights, in recent years, more than 
94% of all § 337 investigations have involved a patent infringement 
allegation.10 
Section 337 became particularly useful for patent enforcement after 
Congress passed the Omnibus Trade And Competitiveness Act of 1988, 
which dropped several requirements that could prevent patent holders 
from using the ITC.11 Congress’s motivation for the amendments was to 
protect domestic IP holders from infringement by foreign companies. 
But inadvertently, Congress crippled the ITC’s ability to shield 
domestic companies by allowing foreign companies with few U.S. ties 
to litigate there and by facilitating litigation against domestic companies 
that import goods. More broadly, Congress did not consider the effect 
that the rapid globalization of trade and manufacturing would have on 
promoting U.S. innovation through the Tariff Act. The present 
arrangement has led to two major problems. 
First, in amending § 337, Congress created a rift between ITC and 
federal court patent law. Part of this problem arises from Congress’s 
failure to make the Patent Act binding on the ITC. In Ki ik Co. v. 
International Trade Commission,12 for example, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the ITC’s decision that defenses under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g)13 do 
                                                                                                                     
Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1035 (2003). 
 7. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006). Because the unfair practices provision of the Tariff Act was 
once codified at 19 U.S.C. § 337, it is commonly referred to as “§ 337.” 
 8. U.S. INT’ L TRADE COMM’N, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL 
YEAR 2007, at 67 (2007) [hereinafter ITC PERFORMANCE REPORT], available at 
http://www.usitc.gov/ext_relations/about_itc/USITC_PAR_2007.pdf. 
 9. See ITC Trial Lawyers Association, Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Section 
337, http://www.itctla.org/faq.cfm (last visited Apr. 20, 2009). 
 10. See U.S. INT’ L TRADE COMM’N, YEAR IN TRADE 2007: OPERATION OF THE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 59TH REPORT 2-10 (2008), available at http://www.usitc.gov/public 
ations/pub4026.pdf (noting 100% of new cases in 2007 included allegations of patent 
infringement); U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, YEAR IN REVIEW: FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 14 (2006) 
(noting 94.3% of all active cases in the 2006 fiscal year involved patent allegations, while the 
remainder of cases involved trademark, trade dress, or dilution claims). 
 11. See infra Part IV.B. 
 12. 362 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  
 13. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006). 
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not apply to ITC proceedings involving § 337.14 ITC decisions, 
moreover, do not have collateral estoppel effect on federal court 
decisions,15 leading to inconsistent judgments. Such decisions cause 
incoherence in patent law and ultimately threaten innovation. 
Second, in interpreting its organic statute, the ITC makes patent 
policy that is sometimes in tension with the purpose of the patent 
system. In particular, the ITC hinders innovation and harms the public 
welfare by frequently granting exclusion orders. The ITC is not bound 
by the Supreme Court’s ruling in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,16 
which limits the ability of district courts to grant injunctions. The FTC’s 
overuse of injunctive relief has led to decisions that harm domestic 
companies and threaten innovation. 
This Article proposes that Congress amend § 337 to harmonize ITC 
patent law with the Patent Act, in order to promote innovation and 
ensure the coherency of the patent system. Alternatively, it suggests that 
Congress abolish § 337. Part II provides an overview of the ITC. Part 
III discusses how Congress created the ITC to secure protectionist 
support for trade liberalization. It then discusses how Congress failed to 
consider the implication of its actions on the patent system. Part IV 
looks at the evolution of § 337 into a patent enforcement statute under 
the Omnibus Trade Act of 1988. It examines the rationale for the 
expansion of § 337 and discusses the changes that Congress made.  
Parts V and VI discuss problems that have emerged from Congress’s 
transformation of § 337 to a patent enforcement statute. Part V 
discusses how ITC and federal court patent law are diverging in the area 
of process patents and applicable defenses. It further discusses how ITC 
decisions do not have preclusive effect on subsequent federal court 
proceedings and how this has led to forum shopping and other strategic 
behavior by patent holders. It suggests that Congress bind the ITC to the 
Patent Act and grant collateral estoppel effect to ITC proceedings. 
Part VI highlights the problems caused by the ITC’s liberal use of 
exclusion orders. It offers suggestions to Congress on how to amend 
§ 337 to reduce the issuance of harmful orders. Finally, Part VI argues 
that Congress needs to take a uniform approach to promoting innovation 
in the patent system. To the extent that this is not feasible, Part VI 
suggests that Congress abolish § 337 and bring exclusion orders under 
the Patent Act.  
                                                                                                                     
 14. Kinik, 362 F.3d at 1362–63. The holding of the case does not turn on the court’s 
analysis of 35 U.S.C. § 271(g). Nevertheless, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) raised the 
issue of whether that portion of the opinion was good law, nd flagged it for future 
consideration. See Order No. 22, In re Sucralose, Sweeteners Containing Sucralose, & Related 
Intermediate Compounds Thereof, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-604, 2007 WL 2900049 (Oct. 1, 
2007). 
 15. See infra Part VI.B. 
 16. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006); see infra Part VI. 
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II.   PATENT DECISIONS IN THE ITC VS. FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT 
Patent litigation in the ITC differs significantly from litigation in 
federal court. A staff attorney is assigned to each investigation to 
represent the public interest and acts as a third-party litigant.17 An 
Administrative Law Judge decides the outcome of the investigation, 
which is then reviewed by six ITC commissioners, and jury trials are 
not available.18 Most importantly, the ITC can issue a unique form of 
injunctive relief called an exclusion order, which blocks goods that 
infringe the patent at issue from entering the country.19 
To illustrate how ITC litigation works, suppose U.S.-based 
GoodCorp owns a patent on widgets. Further suppose that competitor 
BadCorp, also in the U.S., is selling infringing widgets. BadCorp does 
not make these widgets, but rather, buys them from an Indian 
manufacturer ForeignCorp and imports them into the U.S. GoodCorp 
decides to litigate against BadCorp and ForeignCorp in the ITC.  
A.  Initial Requirements 
1.  Domestic Industry Requirement  
To litigate in the ITC, GoodCorp must show that “an industry in the 
United States, relating to the articles protected by the patent, . . . exists 
or is in the process of being established.”20 The ITC divides this 
requirement into two prongs, the technical prong and economic prong.21 
To meet the technical prong, GoodCorp must show that it or its 
licensees “practices at least one claim of the asserted patents[.]”22 To 
meet the economic prong, GoodCorp must show that it engages in 
domestic activities, with respect to the patent or patented article, that 
involve: “(A) significant investment in plant and equipment; (B) 
significant employment of labor or capital; or (C) substantial investment 
in [the patent’s] exploitation, including engineering, research and 
development, or licensing.”23 The economic prong’s purpose is “to 
assure that domestic production-related activities, as opposed to those of 
                                                                                                                     
 17. U.S. INT’ L TRADE COMM’N, SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS: ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS 2 (2004) [hereinafter ITC FAQ], available at http://www.usitc.gov/trade_r 
emedy/int_prop/pub3708.pdf. The staff attorney’s role illustrates that a § 337 proceeding “is not 
purely private litigation ‘between the parties’ but rather is an ‘investigation’ by the 
Government.” Young Eng’rs, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 721 F.2d 1305, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 
1983). 
 18. See ITC FAQ, supra note 17, at 18–21; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1330(a). 
 19. ITC FAQ, supra note 17, at 3. 
 20. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2). 
 21. In re Male Prophylactic Devices, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-546, 2007 ITC LEXIS 860, 
at *60 (Aug. 1, 2007). 
 22. Id. 
 23. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3).  
6
Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss3/3
2009] THE OTHER PATENT AGENCY 535 
 
a mere importer, are protected by the statute.”24 Determination of 
whether the prong has been met is highly subjective.25 
2.  Jurisdiction 
The ITC does not need personal jurisdiction over BadCorp and 
ForeignCorp. Instead, the ITC has in rem jurisdiction over the allegedly 
infringing widgets.26 This provision allows GoodCorp to obtain relief 
from foreign infringers that are potentially beyond the reach of U.S. 
courts, such as ForeignCorp.27 Although the “defendant” is the 
infringing widgets, foreign manufacturers and importers are served with 
a copy of the complaint and given an opportunity to participate in the 
proceeding.28 These parties may raise any equitable or legal defense, 
such as patent invalidity.29 The ITC also has nationwide jurisdiction to 
conduct investigations, including nationwide service of process for 
subpoena enforcement actions.30 GoodCorp can take advantage of this 
power if it wants to compel out-of-district third party witnesses to 
testify at trial.31 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 24. Male Prophylactic Devices, 2007 ITC LEXIS 860, at *61 (citing In re Products with 
Gremlins Character Depictions, USITC Pub. 1815, Inv. No. 337-TA-201, at 6 (Mar. 1986)). 
 25. See id. at *62 (“The Commission’s determination on the economic prong is not made 
according to any rigid formula—there is no mathematical threshold test. Instead, the 
determination is made by ‘an examination of the facts in each investigation, the article of 
commerce, and the realities of the marketplace.’” (quoting In re Double-Sided Floppy Disk 
Drives and Components Thereof, USITC Pub. 1860, Inv. No. 337-TA-215, at 17 (May 1986))). 
 26. See Sealed Air Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 645 F.2d 976, 985 (C.C.P.A. 1981) 
(“An exclusion order operates against goods, not parties. . . . The Tariff Act of 1930 . . . [was] 
intended to provide an adequate remedy for domestic industries against unfair methods of 
competition and unfair acts instigated by foreign concerns operating beyond the in personam 
jurisdiction of domestic courts.”); Robert G. Krupka et al., Section 337 and the GATT: The 
Problem or the Solution?, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 779, 789 (1993). Note, however, that in personam 
jurisdiction can be established by personal appearance, and may need to be established for the 
agency to issue a cease and desist order to enforce a § 337 violation. DONALD KNOX DUVALL , 
FEDERAL UNFAIR COMPETITION ACTIONS: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE UNDER SECTION 337 OF THE 
TARIFF ACT OF 1930, at 63, 71–107 (Clark Boardman Co., Ltd., ed. 1991) (1992). 
 27. See sources cited, supra note 26.  
 28. Walter J. Blenko, When Does Patent Infringement Become Unfair Competition?, 
JOM, Oct. 1990, at 55, 55, available at http://www.tms.org/pubs/journals/JOM/matters/matters-
9010.html. 
 29. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (2006). Note, however, that the ITC has held that defenses 
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) are not available in § 337 proceedings.  See Part V. 
 30. See U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n v. ASAT, Inc., 411 F.3d 245, 247–48 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(noting that the ITC “may require the ‘attendance of witnesses and the production of such 
documentary evidence . . . from any place in the United States at any designated place of 
hearing’” (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1333(b))). 
 31. See Bruce Barker & Steward Brown, Why You Should Consider the ITC Option, 
MANAGING INTELL. PROP., Apr. 2003, at 39, 41. 
7
Kumar: The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the ITC
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009
536 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
 
B.  Structure of Proceedings & Remedies 
After GoodCorp files a complaint, the ITC will decide if action is 
merited.32 If it chooses to proceed, it will open an investigation.33 The 
investigation is then referred to one of six ALJs for an evidentiary 
hearing.34 ALJs have a reputation for being more experienced with 
patent law matters compared to most district court judges, given the 
high volume of patent cases that ALJs hear.35 At this time, the ITC’s 
Office of Unfair Import Investigations assigns a staff attorney to 
represent the public interest and serve as a party in the investigation.36 
This attorney is an active participant in the proceedings and can 
influence the outcome of the case.37 
1.  Speed of Proceedings 
ITC proceedings move quickly. The ALJ will set a short discovery 
period, often less than five months.38 ITC discovery is broad, as there 
are few limitations on interrogatories, foreign discovery, and the scope 
of discovery.39 Typically after six or seven months, the ALJ will hold a 
formal evidentiary hearing, in accordance with the Administrative 
Procedure Act.40 Based on the hearing, the ALJ will issue an Initial 
Determination (ID) on GoodCorp’s case, which is certified to the ITC 
with the evidentiary record.41 
 
                                                                                                                     
 32. For details on filing an ITC complaint, see 19 C.F.R. § 210.12 (2008); Robert G. 
Krupka, International Trade Commission Patent Litigation: A Unique Experience, i  PATENT 
LITIGATION 1992, at 475, 480 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property, 
Course Handbook Series No. G4-3892, 1992). 
 33. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1). 
 34. ITC FAQ, supra note 17, at 2. Note that the ITC can hire more than six ALJs, if its 
budget allows. See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, BUDGET JUSTIFICATION: FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 3, 
6, available at http://www.usitc.gov/ext_relations/about_itc/documents/budget_2010.pdf. For 
more information on ALJs, see DUVALL , supra note 26, at 158–66; Hon. Carl C. Charneski, The 
Role of the Office of Administrative Law Judges Within the United States International Trade 
Commission, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 216 (2009). 
 35. Barker & Brown, supra note 31, at 40. 
 36. ITC FAQ, supra note 17, at 2. 
 37. See Russell E. Levine, The Benefits of Using the ITC, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., Sept. 
2004, at 25, 27.  
 38. DUVALL , supra note 26, at 250–51. 
 39. See id.; Lyle Vander Schaaf, ITC Cases Are on the Rise, NAT’ L L.J., Dec. 6, 2004, at 
S1. 
 40. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(b)(3) (2006); ITC FAQ, supra note 17, at 18 (“While the length 
and timing of hearings varies from case to case, in an investigation scheduled to be completed 
within twelve months, for example, the evidentiary hearing often occurs about six or seven 
months after institution of the investigation.”); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (detailing the 
requirement of formality under the Administrative Procedure Act). 
 41. See ITC FAQ, supra note 17, at 2. 
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The decision then automatically goes up to the ITC’s six-member 
Commission, who have the option to decline review of the ID (allowing 
it to become final), review and adopt it, modify it, or reverse it.42 The 
Commission’s order goes into effect after sixty days, except in the rare 
event that the President disapproves of it on policy grounds under 
§ 337(j).43 If GoodCorp’s proceeding—from start to finish—takes the 
average amount of time, it will conclude in just under seventeen 
months,44 which is faster then some so-called “rocket docket” district 
courts.45 
2.  Remedies 
A unique feature of § 337 litigation is the availability of exclusion 
orders. Cash damages are not available in the ITC.46 Rather, if 
GoodCorp prevails, the Commission will generally enter a limited or 
general exclusion order.47 Limited exclusion orders instruct the U.S. 
                                                                                                                     
 42. See id. at 21. The commissioners are nominated by the president and confirmed by the 
Senate. James M. De Vault, Congressional Dominance and the International Trade 
Commission, 110 PUBLIC CHOICE 1, 4 (2002). This reduces the likelihood that free trade or 
protectionist extremists are confirmed. I . The commissioners serve non-renewable terms of 
nine years, unless appointed to fill an unexpired term. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. 
INT’ L TRADE COMM’N, INSPECTION REPORT NO. OIG-IR-01-02, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
COMMISSION’S POLICIES AND PROCEDURES RELATED TO THE RURAL DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1972, 
at 1 (2002). No more than three commissioners may be members of the same political party. Id. 
 43. Presidents have overturned five ITC decisions since the agency was created in 1974, 
and have not done so since the mid-1980s. See Press Release, Broadcom Corp., Broadcom 
Urges Administration to Let ITC Patent Action Stand (July 5, 2007), available at 
http://www.broadcom.com/press/release.php?id=1023034. In explaining why the Bush 
administration declined to overturn the ITC’s decision in In re Baseband Processor Chips and 
Chipsets, Transmitter and Receiver (Radio) Chips, Power Control Chips, and Products 
Containing Same, Including Cellular Telephone Handsets, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-543, 2007 
ITC LEXIS 621 (June 19, 2007), rev’d in part sub nom., Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. U.S. Int’l 
Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008), U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab 
noted: “I am continuing the practice of successive Administrations of exercising section 337 
review authority with restraint, reserving for extraordinary cases the power to disapprove the 
findings and orders of the USITC.” Press Release, Office of the United States Trade 
Representative, Schwab Decision on the ITC Investigation of Certain Processor Chips (Aug. 6, 
2007), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2007/August/Schwa 
b_Decision_on_the_ITC_Investigation_of_Certain_Processor_Chips.html. 
 44. See ITC PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 70 (noting that from the 2003–2006 
fiscal years, the average time for completion of a § 337 investigation was fifteen months, rising 
to 16.6 months during the 2007 fiscal year). 
 45. “Rocket dockets” refer to district courts—or occasionally, to particular district court 
judges—that have adopted procedural practices that allow patent cases to be litigated quickly.  
See Carrie E. Johnson, Comment, Rocket Dockets: Reducing Delay in Federal Civil Litigation, 
85 CAL. L. REV. 225, 227 (1997). The Eastern District of Texas, which is a well-known rocket 
docket, takes 17.7 months, on average, to get a case to trial. See Sacha Pfeiffer, Blueprint for 
Boston: Make it a Patent-Fight Arena, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 8, 2007, at C1. 
 46. See ITC FAQ, supra note 17, at 22. 
 47. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2006); ITC FAQ, supra note 17, at 22–23. 
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Customs and Border Protection (Customs) to exclude from entry all 
articles that are covered by the patent at issue and that originate from a 
named respondent in the investigation.48 General exclusion orders, in 
contrast, direct Customs “to exclude all infringing articles, without 
regard to source.”49 Preliminary injunctions are also available, though 
requests for the injunctions are relatively uncommon, given the speed of 
ITC litigation.50 
The ITC, in theory, must consider policy implications of an 
exclusion order before issuing one. The ITC can decline to issue an 
exclusion order, or can narrow it, if, “after considering the effect of 
such exclusion upon the public health and welfare, competitive 
conditions in the United States economy, the production of like or 
directly competitive articles in the United States, and United States 
consumers, [the ITC] finds that such articles should not be excluded 
from entry” or such an order should not be issued.51 In practice, 
however, policy considerations do little to mitigate the harsh effects of 
exclusion orders.52 
At its discretion, the ITC may issue a cease-and-desist order in 
addition to or in place of an exclusion order.53 Such orders issue against 
specific respondents and prevent sale of “commercially significant” 
domestic inventories of infringing goods.54 For respondents without 
domestic inventory, exclusion orders are generally used.55 
C.  Dual Litigation and Conflicting Judgments 
When a party litigates a patent infringement dispute in the ITC, it 
does not lose the right to litigate in federal court. Thus, GoodCorp can 
pursue an ITC action in addition to a district court action56 a d can even 
                                                                                                                     
 48. See ITC FAQ, supra note 17, at 22. See generally, Merritt R. Blakeslee, Post-
Litigation Enforcement of Remedial Orders Issued by the U.S. International Trade Commission 
in Section 337 Investigations, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 248 (2009). 
 49. ITC FAQ, supra note 17, at 22; see Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade 
Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 50. Steven E. Adkins & June E. Cohan, Not Mere Litigation: Remedies Available for IP 
Infringement at the International Trade Commission, COMP. &  INTERNET LAWYER, May 2005, at 
16, 18. 
 51. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1). 
 52. See infra Part VI.A.1. 
 53. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(1); Fuji Photo Film Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 386 
F.3d 1095, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 54. See Fuji Photo Film, 386 F.3d at 1107; In re Integrated Repeaters, Switches, and 
Transceivers, USITC Pub. 3547, Inv. No. 337-TA-435, 2002 ITC LEXIS 615, at *56 (Oct. 
2002). 
 55. FujiPhoto Film, 386 F.3d at 1107. 
 56. It is also possible to have “parallel district court and [ITC] patent infringement actions 
and [Patent and Trademark Office] interferences.” Charles L. Goltz, Parallel District Court and 
ITC Infringement Actions and PTO Interferences, 83 J. PAT. &  TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 607, 
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receive conflicting judgments.57 The availability of dual litigation is 
well established by the courts.58 In 1994, Congress enacted a provision 
stating that at the request of any party in a § 337 ITC proceeding, “the 
district court shall stay, until the determination of the Commission 
becomes final, proceedings in the civil action with respect to any claim 
that involves the same issues involved in the proceeding before the 
Commission . . . .”59 
Dual litigation remains highly controversial.60 As one district court 
noted, “by allowing parallel proceedings and indeed almost encouraging 
them, Congress has created the real possibility of inconsistent results 
between ITC and district court proceedings.”61 The court’s concern is 
supported by empirical evidence. Of the twenty-two parallel cases from 
1972 to 2006, nine of them had conflicting decisions.62 This number 
will likely rise, given the significant increase in § 337 investigations63 
and the fact that 65% of investigations have a district court 
                                                                                                                     
608 (2001). 
 57. For example, the ITC found that U.S. Philips Corporation’s six patents pertaining to 
recordable compact discs were unenforceable due to patent misuse, but a year later, a district 
court held that the same six patents were valid and infringed. Compare In re Recordable 
Compact Discs and Rewritable Compact Discs, USITC Pub. 3686, Inv. No. 337-TA-474, 2004 
WL 1435791 (Mar. 2004), with U.S. Philips Corp. v. Princo Corp., 361 F. Supp. 2d 168, 183 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005); vacated, 173 Fed. App’x 832 (Fed. Cir. 2006).  
 58. See Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., 231 F.3d 1325, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see 
also Kaisha v. Bombardier, Inc., No. SA CV 00-549, 2001 WL 1388911, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 
9, 2001) (“[S]tatutory provisions appear to indicate that ITC proceedings may proceed 
simultaneously with district court proceedings . . . .”).  
 59. 28 U.S.C. § 1659(a) (2006). In 1989, a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) panel ruled that § 337 violated national treatment provisions in Article III, section 4 of 
GATT. See United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Report by the Panel Adopted 
on 7 November 1989 (L/6439), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Basic Instruments and 
Selected Documents 345, 396 (36th Supp. 1990); James Thuo Gathii, Construing Intellectual 
Property Rights and Competition Policy Consistently with Facilitating Access to Affordable 
Aids Drugs to Low-End Consumers, 53 FLA. L. REV. 727, 767 (2001). This led Congress to 
amend § 337 in 1994 under the Uruguay Round, in an attempt to bring the U.S. into compliance 
with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. S e Joel W. Rodgers & Joseph P. Whitlock, 
Is Section 337 Consistent with the GATT and the TRIPS Agreement?, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 
459, 478–81 (2002). 
 60. Some commentators have suggested stripping the ITC of jurisdiction for cases where 
a federal court would have jurisdiction. See Robert W. Hahn & Hal J. Singer, Assessing Bias in 
Patent Infringement Cases: A Review of International Trade Commission Decisions, 21 HARV. 
J.L. &  TECH. 457, 487 (2008).  
 61. Kaisha, 2001 WL 1388911, at *2. 
 62. Hahn & Singer, supra note 60, at 480–81. 
 63. A Record Number of Section 337 Cases Filed at the ITC, as the Supreme Court’s eBay 
Decision Makes Section 337 an Even More Attractive Alternative Than Ever to District Court 
Litigation, INTELL. PROP. LITIG. ALERT (Bingham McCutchen, L.L.P.), July 5, 2006, at 1, 
available at http://www.bingham.com/Media.aspx?MediaID=2830. 
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counterpart.64 Conflicting decisions result from the fact that ITC 
decisions are not entitled to preclusive effect in federal court.65 
III.   THE HISTORY OF THE MODERN ITC 
Congress created the ITC to gain protectionist support for trade 
reform. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Congress made several 
attempts to pass trade legislation to address problems with the U.S. 
economy. It was difficult for Congress to secure reform because of a 
split between free trade supporters and protectionists. Congress 
overcame the deadlock by creating the ITC as part of the Trade Reform 
Act of 1974.66 Under this Act, Congress liberalized trade in an attempt 
to alleviate looming economic crisis.67 As a compromise, Congress also 
replaced the U.S. Tariff Commission, which only had advisory power, 
with the ITC. The ITC received expanded powers under § 337 to 
remedy acts of unfair competition, including patent infringement. 
Despite creating a new remedy for patent infringement, Congress 
gave little consideration to how § 337 would affect patent law. It did not 
require the ITC to abide by the Patent Act, an omission that would later 
cause inconsistency between patent litigation in the ITC versus in 
federal court. More importantly, the ITC did not consider the effect that 
the protectionist agency could have on technological innovation. 
A.  The Tariff Commission and the Move Toward Free Trade 
The United States Tariff Commission was created in 191668 and has 
been described as “a relic of an era when tariff treaties did not exist.”69 
The early Tariff Commission had three primary functions: (1) to help 
Congress set tariff rates by providing pertinent information, (2) to make 
                                                                                                                     
 64. Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at 
the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. &  MARY L. REV. 63, 70 (2008) (studying § 337 
cases initiated between January 1995 and June 2007). 
 65. See infra Part V.B. 
 66. See S. REP. No. 93-1298, at 5 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186, 7187 
(“The Trade Reform Act of 1974, which the Committee on Finance now reports to the Senate 
with amendments, coincides with a serious crisis in the domestic and world economies. Twenty 
months have passed since former President Nixon requested the Congress to provide the 
Executive with authority to negotiate ‘a more open and equitable trading world.’ Events during 
the past year have severely strained the world’s economy, underscoring the need to find 
cooperative solutions to common domestic and international economic problems.”). 
 67. See id.; J. Kennerly Davis, Jr., Comment, The Trade Reform Act of 1973, 15 HARV. 
INT’ L. L.J. 126, 126 (1974) (“That policy currently is at its most critical juncture in over 25 
years due to an extended series of trade and payments deficits, repeated currency crises, and a 
significant devaluation of the dollar.”). 
 68. Revenue Act, ch. 463, § 700, 39 Stat. 795, 795 (1916).  
 69. ROGER G. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE ASH COUNCIL 
PROPOSALS 61 (1971). 
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recommendations to Congress upon request, and (3) to provide 
information to help the President administer the tariff laws.70 The Tariff 
Act of 1930—more commonly known as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff—
gave the agency investigative powers.71 The Smoot-Hawley Tariff is 
best known for raising U.S. tariffs to historically high levels, which 
some scholars believe exacerbated the severity of the Great 
Depression.72 
The government’s effort to liberalize trade began, in earnest, in the 
1960s, when President Kennedy proposed a new trade agreement to 
“meet the challenges and opportunities of a rapidly changing world 
economy.”73 Congress responded with The Trade Expansion Act of 
1962,74 which provided a significant tariff reduction. The Act’s purpose 
was to stimulate economic growth, enlarge foreign markets for U.S. 
goods, and to strengthen relations with other countries through free 
trade.75 The Act gave the President broad authority to negotiate tariff 
reductions of as much as 50%.76 Furthermore, it authorized U.S. 
participation in the Kennedy Round of multilateral trade negotiations 
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.77 
Despite this initial shift toward free trade, protectionists would soon 
make policy inroads. In the mid to late 1960s, the U.S. payment deficit 
worsened, paving the way for trade restrictions.78 In 1967, Congress let 
                                                                                                                     
 70. Id. 
 71. Tariff Act, ch. 497, § 337, 46 Stat. 696, 703 (1930) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1330) (“To assist the President in making any decisions under this section the commission is 
hereby authorized to investigate any alleged violation hereof on complaint under oath or upon 
its initiative.”). 
 72. See Robert E. Hudac, “Circumventing” Democracy: The Political Morality of Trade 
Negotiations, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT’ L L. &  POL. 311, 313 (1993) (discussing how the Smoot-Hawley 
Tariff led to a massive increase in tariffs, leading to a “sharp contraction of world trade that 
contributed substantially to the length and depth of [the Great Depression]”). 
 73. President’s Special Message to Congress on Foreign Trade Policy, 2 PUB. PAPERS 68 
(Jan. 25, 1962). 
 74. Trade Expansion Act, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 102, 76 Stat. 872, 872. (1962). 
 75. The Statement of Purpose for the Act was  
(1) to stimulate the economic growth of the United States and maintain and 
enlarge foreign markets for the products of United States agriculture, industry, 
mining, and commerce; (2) to strengthen economic relations with foreign 
countries through the development of open and nondiscriminatory trading in 
the free world; and (3) to prevent Communist economic penetration.  
Id. 
 76. Id. § 201(b), 76 Stat. at 872; EDWARD G. HINKELMAN , DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE: HANDBOOK OF THE GLOBAL TRADE COMMUNITY 170 (6th ed. 2005). 
 77. HINKELMAN , supra note 76, at 170. 
 78. THOMAS W. ZEILER, AMERICAN TRADE AND POWER IN THE 1960S, at 241 (1992) 
(“Augmented by the falling trade surplus, domestic inflation, and an overvalued dollar, the 
American payments deficit eventually led to more drastic—and trade-restrictive—measures by 
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the President’s power to negotiate tariff reductions expire.79 Labor 
unions and other domestic industries began calling for the establishment 
of trade quotas.80 The response from Congress was the unsuccessful 
Trade Act of 1970,81 in which Congress sought to sharply reduce 
imports and was derided by commentators and economists.82 The 
Foreign Trade and Investment Act of 1972 followed,83 which was 
designed “to ‘discourage American business investment abroad and [to] 
limit the flow of imports into this country.’”84 This bill also failed. 
The economy continued to sour. In 1970, unemployment hit 6.1% 
and the country entered a recession.85 The last remnants of fixed 
exchange rate structure between the dollar and gold collapsed in 1971, 
ending the gold standard.86 The OPEC oil embargo followed a year 
later. President Nixon responded with a series of protectionist measures, 
including freezing wages and prices87 and imposing a 10% surcharge on 
imports.88 Trade reform was desperately needed, which meant getting 
both free trade supporters and protectionists to agree on one course of 
action. 
B.  The Trade Act of 1974 and the Birth of the ITC 
The Trade Act of 197489 emerged from a Nixon administration 
proposal to boost the economy by liberalizing trade and to provide the 
President with unprecedented power in U.S. trade policy.90 However, 
President Nixon emphasized that “while trade should be more open, it 
                                                                                                                     
the administration of Richard M. Nixon . . . .”). 
 79. See Kazimierz Grzybowski et al., Towards Integrated Management of International 
Trade—The U.S. Trade Act of 1974, 26 INT’ L &  COMP. L.Q. 283, 284 (1977). 
 80. See EDWARD S. KAPLAN, AMERICAN TRADE POLICY, 1923–1995, at 89 (1996); John B. 
Rehm, Proposed Trade Act of 1970: What Direction U.S. Foreign Trade Policy?, 2 J. MAR. L. 
&  COM. 289, 290 (1971). 
 81. H.R. 18970, 91st Cong. (1970).  
 82. See, e.g., Rehm, supra note 80, at 320 (“On balance, it is a regressive and protectionist 
measure that disregards international obligations as much as sound economics.”); Jerry L. 
Siegel, Note, The Trade Act of 1971: A Fundamental Change in United States Foreign Trade 
Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1418, 1419 (1971) (stating that the bill, if enacted, “would represent a 
retreat from free trade”); Trade: The Black Comedy That Could Come True, TIME, Nov. 23, 
1970, at 97, 97 (arguing that the bill “would turn the clock back 35 years, to the days before the 
nation began leading a highly beneficial world movement toward freer trade”). 
 83. Gryzbowski et al., supra note 79, at 287. 
 84. See id. (citing 117 CONG. REC. 33584 (1971) (statement of Senator Hartke)).  
 85. Thad W. Mirer, The Distributional Impact of the 1970 Recession, 55 REV. OF ECON. &  
STAT. 214, 214 (1973).  
 86. Stephen P. Magee, Currency Contracts, Pass-through, and Devaluation, i  1 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 303, 303 (1973). 
 87. Exec. Order No. 11,615, 36 Fed. Reg. 15,727, 15,727 (Aug. 17, 1971).  
 88. Proclamation No. 4074, 36 Fed. Reg. 15,724, 15,724 (1971). 
 89. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975). 
 90. See H.R. 6767, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); see also KAPLAN, supra note 80, at 89. 
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should also be more fair.”91 Increasing fairness included expanding 
protection against unfair competition.92 By balancing free trade with 
broad protectionist measures against unfair competition, President 
Nixon found a way to reconcile the free trade and protectionist factions 
in Congress. 
The bills that entered the House and Senate were the subject of 
fierce debate. Companies that depended on trade—such as IBM, Union 
Carbide, and Exxon—argued in favor of trade liberalization.93 Unions 
led the opposition.94 Notably absent from the debate was a discussion of 
patent or other IP issues. Buried within thousands pages of House and 
Senate testimony was the statement of just one registered patent 
attorney and his associate.95 There were no other IP attorneys or related 
interest groups involved with the debate and only limited discussion of 
patents by other parties.96 
                                                                                                                     
 91. President’s Special Message to Congress Proposing Trade Reform Legislation, 5 PUB. 
PAPERS 258, 261 (Apr. 10, 1973). 
 92. Id. at 265 (“To cope with unfair competitive practices in our own markets, [the] 
proposed legislation would . . . amend the current statute concerning patent infringement by 
subjecting cases involving imports to judicial proceedings similar to those which involve 
domestic infringement . . . .”). 
 93. See The Trade Reform Act of 1973: Hearing on H.R. 6767 Before the H. Comm. on 
Ways & Means, 93d Cong. 691–92 (1973) [hereinafter 1973 House Hearings] (statement of 
Gilbert E. Jones, Chairman of the Board, IBM World Trade Corp.) (arguing that companies 
need to be able to take advantage of foreign technological advances); id. at 2897, 2899 
(statement of Fred C. Kroft, Jr., President, Ferroalloys Division, Union Carbide Corp.) 
(supporting the “permanent [] suspension of duty on [imports of] manganese ore”); id. at 4503–
04 (statement of Emilio G. Collado, Executive Vice President, Exxon Corp.) (“Growth in U.S. 
exports will be required to help defray the growing balance-of-payments costs of oil imports, 
and further multilateral trade liberalization would help to provide growing export 
opportunities.”). 
 94. See The Trade Reform Act of 1973: Hearing on H.R. 10710 Before the S. Comm. on 
Fin., 93d Cong. 1329–31 (1974) [hereinafter 1974 Senate Hearings] (statement of I.W. Abel, 
President, United Steelworkers of America) (opposing the Senate bill); id. at 1687 (statement of 
George Collins, Assistant to the President, International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine 
Workers) (opposing the Senate bill).  
 95. 1973 House Hearings, upra note 93, at 1588–90 (joint statement of Harvey Kaye & 
Paul Plaia, Jr., Attorneys) (suggesting amendments to the bill from the perspective of patent 
attorneys). 
 96. See, e.g., 1973 House Hearings, upra note 93, at 363–64 (statement of Ambassador 
William D. Eberele, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, accompanied by 
Ambassador William R. Pearce, Deputy Special Representative & John H. Jackson, General 
Counsel) (arguing all patent infringement involving foreign wrongdoing should be permitted in 
the ITC); id. at 500–01 (statement of Honorable Fredrick B. Dent, Secretary of Commerce) 
(observing that § 337 “ha[d] been amended to provide patent owners with a simpler, quicker, 
and more effective remedy against infringing imports”); id. at 781 (statement of Kurt Orban, 
President, American Importers Association, Inc.) (“Section 337 should be repealed, permitting 
the regular patent laws to function in this area.”). 
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The final bill, which passed in January 1975, reflected the 
compromise made between free trade supporters and protectionists. To 
protect domestic industry from unfair practices, Congress remade the 
Tariff Commission into the more independent ITC and granted it new 
powers.97 The most important of these powers was the ability to make 
final decisions on issuing exclusion orders, reversible only by the 
president for “policy reasons.”98 Previously, the agency served in an 
advisory capacity, and the President made the ultimate determination of 
whether unfair trade practices had occurred.99 Allowing the ITC to 
make final decisions paved the way for patent owners to use the agency 
for fast remedies. Congress also gave the ITC the power to enforce 
exclusion orders through cease-and-desist orders and civil penalties.100  
But the Act also reflected the lack of input from IP scholars and 
practitioners. Congress did not bind the ITC to the Patent Act. Instead, 
it merely noted that the ITC should use Court of Claims and Patent 
Appeals precedent as guidance and was silent regarding other patent 
precedent. In the House Report, Congress gave wide latitude to the ITC 
in making patent determinations: “The Commission would also consider 
the evolution of patent law doctrines, including defenses based upon 
antitrust and equitable principles, and the public policy of promoting a 
‘free competition’ in the determination of violations of the statute.”101 It 
also granted the ITC the right to consider patent defenses—including 
invalidity—for purposes of § 337 “in accordance with contemporary 
legal standards.”102  
Congress did not consider the effect that such changes would have 
on patent law. Prior to the 1974 amendments, few cases brought under 
§ 337 involved patents.103 It appears that no one anticipated that 
granting broad powers to the ITC for § 337 patent decisions would lead 
to a rise in § 337 patent investigations. In the future, this arrangement 
would lead to strategic behavior by litigants and decisions by the ITC 
that hinder innovation and hurt the public. 
                                                                                                                     
 97. The listed purposes in the Senate Report for the 1974 act include: “To strengthen the 
independence of the United States Tariff Commission . . . [and t]o improve procedures for 
responding to unfair trade practices in the United States and abroad.”  S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 3, 
4 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186, 7187. 
 98. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 337(c)–(d), 88 Stat. 2053, 2054 (1975) 
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c)–(d) (2006)). 
 99. See S. COMM. ON FIN., 93D CONG., COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EXISTING TRADE LAWS 
WITH H.R. 10710—THE TRADE REFORM ACT OF 1973, at 116 (Comm. Print 1974). 
 100. Trade Act of 1974, § 337(f) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)). 
 101. H.R. REP. NO. 93-571, at 78 (1974). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-NSAID-86-150, INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE: STRENGTHENING TRADE LAW PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 14 
(1986) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://archive.gao.gov/d4t4/130844.pdf. 
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IV.   THE EVOLUTION OF § 337 
When Congress amended the Tariff Act in 1988, it was motivated by 
protectionism. Congress found that safeguards against unfair trade 
practices were “cumbersome and costly” and had “not provided United 
States owners of IP rights with adequate protection against foreign 
companies violating such rights.”104 The ITC had become popular with 
U.S. patent holders, but economic tests in the provision prevented many 
patent holders from using the forum.105 Policymakers feared that 
inadequate protection against patent and other IP infringement was 
hurting the nation’s competitiveness in the international marketplace. 
These concerns led to reform under the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988.106 
But Congress did not realize that expanding the ITC’s jurisdiction 
over IP cases was in tension with the ITC’s core mission of protecting 
domestic industry. During the debate for the bill, the ITC warned that 
dropping the economic tests would compromise its ability to protect 
U.S. companies and would transform the ITC into a patent enforcement 
agency. Few parties foresaw that the amendments would harm domestic 
companies that imported goods and would help foreign companies 
enforce their U.S. IP rights. 
Moreover, in making § 337 a “more effective remedy for the 
protection of United States intellectual property rights,”107 Congress 
increased the patent holders’ monopoly without regard to the 
innovation, advancement or social benefit gained. In particular, 
Congress did not require the ITC to follow the Patent Act and failed to 
strengthen requirements for balancing harm to the public welfare 
against harm to the patent holder. 
A.  Debate on Expanding § 337 
By the early to mid-1980s, momentum was building for a major 
revision of the Trade Act of 1974. Although small changes had been 
made in the interim, Congress wanted to address the significant increase 
in IP-related unfair competition investigations brought under § 337, 
most of which involved patent infringement. Interest groups seized this 
opportunity to expand the scope of § 337 to facilitate patent 
enforcement.  
                                                                                                                     
 104. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-418, § 1341(a)(2), 102 
Stat. 1211, 1212 (1988). 
 105. See infra Part IV.B. Patent holders had to show engagement in a domestic industry, 
that said industry was “efficiently and economically operated,” and that the importation of 
infringing goods would “substantially injure [the] industry.” 19 U.S.C. § 337(a) (1982). 
 106. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, § 1. 
 107. Id. § 1341(b). 
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1.  Shift in Use for § 337 
Prior to the enactment of the Trade Act of 1974, the law was seldom 
used to enforce any form of IP rights.108 But the changes made in 1974 
resulted in a dramatic rise in IP infringement cases. Between January 
1975 and April 1985, 75% of all § 337 actions involved patent 
infringement, 22% involved trademark infringement, and 4% copyright 
infringement.109 Only 4% of cases did not involve IP infringement 
issues.110  
In 1983, ITC Chairman Alfred Eckes and other ITC officials 
testified about the rise of IP cases being brought under § 337.111 Eckes 
argued in favor of dropping the requirement that a domestic industry 
must be efficiently and economically operated.112 Three years later, the 
U.S. General Accounting Office issued a report arguing that § 337 
should be amended to “more effectively protect” IP rights against 
infringing imports.113 The report noted that § 337, as written, “was 
intended as a trade statute to protect U.S. firms and workers against all 
types of unfair foreign trade practices.”114 It stated that the 1974 Act’s 
economic tests generally resulted in rights holders being “denied access 
to section 337 relief.”115  
Eckes highlighted the difficulty in administering the outdated 
statute. He testified about the challenges of determining what 
constitutes a domestic industry under § 337, stating:  
In the absence of clear guidance from the statute and 
legislative history, the [ITC] ha[d] been attempting on a 
case-by-case basis to apply [the statute], which was written 
originally more than 50 years ago, to modern 
circumstances of trade in which U.S. based firms 
increasingly source out elements of production to foreign 
suppliers.116  
                                                                                                                     
 108. See GAO REPORT, supra note 103, at 14. 
 109. Id. at 15. 
 110. According to the GAO report, these cases involved claims such as breach of contract, 
collusive bidding, and false advertising. Id at 15 n.10.  
 111. See Options to Improve The Trade Remedy Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 98th Cong. 21, 31 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 House 
Hearings] (statement of Honorable Alfred Eckes, Chairman, U.S. International Trade 
Commission); id. at 9 (statement of Ambassador Michael B. Smith, Deputy U.S. Trade Rep.).
 112. See 1983 House Hearings, upra note 111, at 21 (statement of Honorable Alfred 
Eckes, Chairman, U.S. International Trade Commission). 
 113. GAO Report, supra note 103, at 2. 
 114. Id. at 3. 
 115. Id. at 29. 
 116. 1983 House Hearings, supra note 111, at 22 (statement of Honorable Alfred Eckes, 
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Eckes argued that the statute was ambiguous about whether 
companies that manufactured patented products abroad, but sold the 
products in the U.S., met the domestic industry requirement.117 
2.  Protecting U.S. Industry Through Strong Intellectual 
Property Rights 
The second reason for expanding § 337 was a desire to protect 
domestic industry from foreign competition. The Reagan administration 
supported stronger IP rights to “protect U.S. commercial interests.”118 
Others argued that IP infringement threatened “international 
competitiveness and foreign trade performance.”119 Some commentators 
observed the high cost of international piracy on U.S. companies, 
claiming that it lead to losses of $8 billion to $20 billion a year.120 
Despite the claims that strengthening the enforcement of IP rights 
would help U.S. companies, little attention was paid to how strong 
enforcement might hurt them. U.S. patents were not held only by 
domestic companies, but also by foreign companies with a limited U.S. 
presence. By encouraging Congress to drop entry requirements, 
policymakers inadvertently facilitated use of the ITC by foreign patent 
holders. Nobody appeared to consider the effect that expanding § 337 
could have on domestic companies that depended on imported 
materials. 
3.  Advancing Innovation Through Strong Intellectual    
Property Rights 
The GAO advanced a minority position that U.S. IP rights should be 
stronger for both domestic and foreign holders, in order to promote 
innovation. The GAO report stated that “foreign firms deserve 
protection under section 337,” arguing that foreign U.S. patent holders 
make valuable disclosures of inventions and likely make products 
available to domestic consumers.121 The report also observed that ITC 
                                                                                                                     
Chairman, U.S. International Trade Commission). 
 117. Id. at 18. 
 118. Comprehensive Trade Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 3 Before the Subcomm. on Trade 
of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 100th Cong. 105 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 House Hearings] 
(statement of James A. Baker III, Secretary of the Treasury). 
 119. See id. at 295 (letter from Edward Donley, Chairman of the Board, U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce) (“Violations of U.S. intellectual property rights constitute a significant threat to 
U.S. international competitiveness and foreign trade performance.”).  
 120. See Comparing Major Trade Bills: Hearing on S. 490, S. 636, and H.R. 3 Before the 
S. Comm. on Fin., 100th Cong. 159 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Senate Hearings] (statement of 
William T. Archey, Vice President, International, U.S. Chamber of Commerce); id. at 213–14 
(statement of the Office of the Chemical Industry Trade Advisor) (discussing the problem of 
foreign piracy to U.S. intellectual property holders). 
 121. GAO REPORT, supra note 103, at 35. 
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actions were preferable to district court patent litigation, given the fast 
pace of § 337 proceedings, the availability of in rem jurisdiction, and 
the availability of exclusion orders.122 However, although Congress 
adopted much of the GAO report, it did not express interest in 
strengthening the rights of foreign entities.  
In making the above analysis, the GAO assumed that stronger IP 
rights correlated with increased innovation. It failed to consider that 
companies could use the ITC to exclude products where only a small 
component of the import infringed. It also put too much faith in the ITC 
to deny such an exclusion when no similar product was available on the 
market.123  
4.  Opposition to ITC Expansion 
Opposition to § 337’s expansion came from ITC Chairwoman Paula 
Stern and the ITC Trial Lawyers Association. Responding to the GAO 
Report, Stern maintained that eliminating the injury requirement and 
other economic tests would undermine the ITC’s mission to protect 
domestic industry and would transform the ITC into an IP enforcement 
forum.124 The ITC Trial Lawyers Association agreed, raising the 
concern that foreign companies would be able to use the ITC against 
U.S. companies that import goods.125 The Association further noted that 
the amendments would raise problems under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade.126 These arguments did not appear to influence 
Congress.  
B.  The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 
The 1988 Trade Act significantly broadened the scope of § 337, 
dropping several requirements for patent holders filing complaints. 
Previously, the Act required a patent holder to show that: (1) the patent 
holder was engaged in a domestic industry, (2) the domestic industry 
was “efficiently and economically operated,” and (3) the importation of 
                                                                                                                     
 122. Id. at 16. 
  123. Both of these problems arose in In re Baseband Processor Chips and Chipsets, 
Transmitter and Receiver (Radio) Chips, Power Control Chips, and Products Containing Same, 
Including Cellular Telephone Handsets, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-543 (June 19, 2007). This case 
is discussed in Part IV. 
 124. See id. at 84–85. 
 125. 1987 Senate Hearings, supra note 120, at 344, 347 (comments of the ITC Trial 
Lawyers Association) (“By proposing to eliminate the requirement of injury to an industry in 
the United States, the amendments seek to fundamentally alter the purpose for which Section 
337 was enacted . . . to protect an established or about to be established U.S. industry from 
harm.”).  
 126. See id. at 347–49 (comments of the ITC Trial Lawyers Association); see also GAO 
REPORT, supra note 103, at 85. 
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infringing goods would substantially injure the industry.127 Process 
patents, though covered in a separate provision, were subject to the 
same three requirements.128 
The 1988 Trade Act reduced many of these requirements. Under 
§ 337(a)(1)(B), Congress completely eliminated the second and third 
requirements for IP infringement cases, making it no longer necessary 
for a patent holder to show the industry was “efficiently and 
economically operated” and that infringement would lead to substantial 
injury.129 These changes made it cheaper to litigate patent infringement 
in the ITC130 and expanded patent holders’ access to the ITC.131 
The new language also made changes regarding the treatment of 
patent and other IP infringement.132 With the exception of process 
patents, the prior version of the bill merely prohibited “unlawful unfair 
competition,” leaving it to the ITC to determine which forms of 
                                                                                                                     
 127. The previous version of the statute stated: 
 Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles 
into the United States, or in their sale by the owner, importer, consignee, or 
agent of either, the effect or tendency of which is to destroy or substantially 
injure an industry, efficiently and economically operated, in the United States, 
or to prevent the establishment of such an industry, or to restrain or monopolize 
trade and commerce in the United States, are declared unlawful, and when 
found by the Commission to exist shall be dealt with, in addition to any other 
provisions of law, as provided in this section. 
19 U.S.C. 337(a) (1987)  
 128. Section 337a stated:  
The importation for use, sale, or exchange of a product made, produced, 
processed, or mined under or by means of a process covered by the claims of 
any unexpired valid United States letters patent, shall have the same status for 
the purposes of section 337 of this title as the importation of any product or 
article covered by the claims of any unexpired valid United States letters 
patent. 
19 U.S.C. § 337a (1987). 
 129. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) (1988) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1337(a)(1)(B) (2006)). 
 130. See 1983 House Hearings, supra note 111, at 21 (statement of Honorable Alfred 
Eckes, Chairman, U.S. International Trade Commission) (recommending that the “efficiently 
and economically operated” provision be deleted, in order to reduce the cost of litigation under 
§ 337); DUVALL , supra note 26, at 4 (“[I]t is estimated that over one-half of the high cost of 
section 337 litigation . . . is attributable to the legal costs of satisfying the economic criteria.” 
(citing GAO REPORT, supra note 103, at 31)). 
 131. See GAO REPORT, supra note 103, at 29 (describing how eleven firms were unable to 
meet the economic relief requirement between 1974 and 1986, of which, six were denied relief 
solely on this ground). 
 132. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) (1988) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1337(a)(1)(B) (2006)). 
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infringement were included.133 The 1988 Trade Act added provisions to 
§ 337 explicitly covering IP infringement, including patents. It also 
extended § 337 to cover process patents.134 
The new legislation also made it easier for patent holders to meet the 
domestic industry requirement. Previously, in ITC actions involving 
patent infringement, the Federal Circuit found that “the patent must be 
exploited by production in the United States” for a domestic industry to 
exist.135 The revised § 337 clarified that an industry exists for the IP in 
question if there was “(A) significant investment in plant and 
equipment, (B) significant employment of labor or capital; or (C) 
substantial investment in its exploitation, including engineering, 
research and development, or licensing.”136 Because investment in 
licensing counts as a domestic industry, this definition includes 
universities, “intellectual property owners who engage in extensive 
licensing of their rights to manufacturers,”137 and patent trolls.138  
In the 1988 Trade Act, Congress failed to recognize that 
protectionism and patent enforcement are not complementary 
objectives. In providing patent holders with greater access to the ITC, 
Congress opened the door to an increase in infringement suits brought 
against domestic companies, both by domestic and foreign U.S. patent 
holders. Congress failed to strengthen balancing requirements under 
§ 337(d) to prevent issuance of exclusion orders when domestic 
companies would be unduly harmed.139 
In attempting to make § 337 serve two functions, Congress created a 
provision that does neither job particularly well. It did not clarify the 
role of the Patent Act in the ITC, allowing the ITC and the Federal 
Circuit to declare certain parts of the Patent Act as non-binding on the 
                                                                                                                     
 133. See 19 U.S.C. § 337 (1987). 
 134. See § 1337 (a)(1)(B)(ii) (1988) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) 
(2006)). 
 135. Schaper Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 717 F.2d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 93-571 (1973)). 
 136. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3) (1988) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3) 
(2006)). 
 137. H.R. REP. NO. 100-40, pt. 1, at 157 (1987), reprinted in 2 Bernard D. Reams & Mary 
Ann Nelson, Trade Reform Legislation 1988: A Legislative History of the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitive-ness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418 (1991). 
 138. See William A. Drennan, The Patented Loophole: How Should Congress Respond to 
this Judicial Invention?, 59 FLA. L. REV. 299-302 (2007) (discussing how the term “patent troll” 
has been expanded to include inventors who obtains a patent but have no plans to produce a 
product under it). 
 139. Although § 1337(d) requires that the ITC balance the benefit of an exclusion order 
with the harm to the public welfare, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (1988) (codified as amended at 19 
U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) (2006)), competitive conditions in the United States economy, and other 
factors, exclusion orders are very rarely denied on such grounds. See infra Part VI.A.1. 
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ITC.140 Congress failed to grant ITC proceedings collateral estoppel 
effect in federal court to ensure coherency in patent law. The 1988 
statutory language also allowed the ITC to continue issuing broad 
exclusion orders whenever it found patent infringement. This situation 
has prevented respondent companies from making innovative products, 
even when the patent at issue covers only a small component of the 
product and when the patent holder does not offer a similar product.141 
To resolve this tension, Congress could refocus § 337 to protect 
domestic industry. One way to achieve this goal would be to prohibit 
§ 337 investigations against companies over which U.S. courts have 
personal jurisdiction. This change would protect U.S. companies from 
§ 337 litigation.142 Congress could likewise reintroduce the pre-1988 
domestic industry requirement, making it harder for foreign companies 
to use the agency.  
Regardless of whether such protectionism is warranted, such a 
change is highly unlikely. In making it easier to litigate patent disputes 
before the ITC, Congress acknowledged that § 337’s main purpose was 
for IP enforcement. The ITC has become far too valuable as a patent 
litigation forum—by offering patent holders fast proceedings, unique 
relief, and judges well-versed in patent law.  
V.  DIVERGENCE OF ITC AND FEDERAL COURT PATENT LAW 
Six years before passing the 1988 Trade Act, Congress created the 
Federal Circuit to decrease forum shopping and reduce inconsistencies 
in federal adjudication.143 But Congress did not consider how federal 
agencies fit into the fabric of patent jurisprudence—neither when 
creating the Federal Circuit nor when revising the Trade Act. 
As the caseload in the ITC has grown over the past ten years, 
questions have begun to emerge regarding whether the Patent Act, in its 
entirety, applies to the ITC. In Kinik Co. v. International Trade 
Commission, the Federal Circuit affirmed the ITC’s finding that 
                                                                                                                     
 140. See infra Part V. 
 141. This point was illustrated in In re Baseband Processor Chips and Chipsets, 
Transmitter and Receiver (Radio) Chips, Power Control Chips, and Products Containing Same, 
Including Cellular Telephone Handsets, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-543, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621 
(June 19, 2007), rev’d in part sub nom., Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 
545 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008). See infra Part VI.B. 
 142. See Hahn & Singer, supra note 60, at 488; Editorial, Hot Topic: Patent Bending, 
WALL ST. J., June 9, 2007, at A8 (“If Congress really wants to help, it could start by refusing to 
let companies like Broadcom use the ITC as a legal backstop at the same time they’re suing in 
federal court.”). 
 143. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982); 
H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20 (1981). 
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defenses under § 271(g) of the Patent Act—pertaining to process 
patents—do not apply under § 337.144 This decision was extremely 
controversial and led to debate over whether Congress intended the ITC 
to be bound by the Patent Act.145 The ITC and Federal Circuit abruptly 
reversed course a few years later in another case pertaining to process 
patents, Amgen, Inc. v. International Trade Commission.146 In this case, 
the Federal Circuit affirmed the ITC’s holding that the safe-harbor 
provision under § 271(e) is applicable in § 337 proceedings.147 
Other issues have emerged from the rise in parallel ITC/district court 
litigation, exacerbated by the fact that ITC decisions are not entitled to 
preclusive effect in federal court.148 The result has been strategic 
behavior by litigants, and sometimes, conflicting decisions between the 
forums, leading to uncertainty.149 These issues highlight the need to 
                                                                                                                     
 144. 362 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004). This was not the first time that the ITC found 
that § 271(g) defenses did not apply in § 337 proceedings. See In re Recombinantly Produced 
Human Growth Hormones, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-358, 1994 WL 930040 (Nov. 29, 1994) 
(holding that the 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) exception does not apply to respondent, and refusing to 
apply the § 271(g) grandfather clause because “the legislative history cited by [respondent] does 
not establish that the Process Patent Act was enacted to modify remedies previously available 
under section 337. Rather, the Process Patent Act provides for an additional remedy in the 
district courts”); Notice of Issuance of Limited Exclusion Order and Cease and Desist Orders, In 
re Plastic Encapsulated Integrated Circuits, USITC Pub. 2574, Inv. No. 337-TA-315, 1992 WL 
813959 (Oct. 1992) (letting stand the ALJ’s opinion that “the Patent Amendments recognized 
section 337 as an independent cause of action in that the addition of section 271(g) did not 
deprive a patent owner of any remedies available under section 337”); Order No. 19, In re 
Methods of Making Carbonated Candy Products, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-292, 1989 WL 
608892 (Sept. 1, 1989) (holding that § 271(g) defenses cannot be raised in § 337 proceedings). 
 145. See Process Patents: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 86–
87 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 Senate Hearings] (statement of John Thomas, Professor of Law, 
Georgetown Law School) (testifying that the ITC interprets the Patent Act whenever it makes 
patent-related determinations, and that it was thus improper of the Kinik court to grant Chevron 
deference to the agency); Rodgers & Whitlock, supra note 59, at 471 (stating that in § 337 
cases, the ITC applies “the same substantive patent law as a federal district court would”); John 
M. Eden, Comment, Unnecessary Indeterminacy: Process Patent Protection After Kinik v. ITC, 
2006 DUKE L. &  TECH. REV. 9, ¶ 12 (2006), http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/pdf/2 
006DLTR0009.pdf. But see 2007 Senate Hearings, supra note 144, at 44 (written statement of 
Christopher A. Cotropia, Associate Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law) 
(testifying that while district courts are charged to enforce patents via the Patent Act, the ITC 
polices trade-related activities and protects domestic industries under the Tariff Act (citing 19 
U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2), (3) (1988); Tandon Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 831 F.2d 1017, 
1019 (Fed. Cir. 1987))). 
 146. No. 2007-1014, 2009 WL 1151856, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 30, 2009). 
 147. Id. at 1345. 
 148. See infra Part V.B. 
 149. See Kaisha v. Bombardier, Inc., No. SA CV 00-549, 2001 WL 1388911, at *2–3 
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restore uniformity between agency and federal court patent proceedings. 
A.  Process Patents and Applicable Defenses 
1.  Kinik v. ITC 
In Kinik, the Taiwan-based Kinik Company argued that its products 
did not infringe a 3M process patent.150 It maintained that the patented 
process “was materially changed by a subsequent process,” thus 
providing it with a defense under § 271(g) of the Patent Act.151 The ALJ 
rejected this defense and found Kinik’s products infringed the 3M 
patent.152 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed this part of the decision,153 
though it ultimately ruled against the ITC on other grounds.154 Judge 
Newman, writing for the panel, concluded that defenses under 
§ 271(g)(1) and (g)(2) do not apply in § 337 proceedings.155 The 
decision was based on the legislative history and the text of the Process 
Patent Amendments Act of 1988, which states that defenses apply only 
“for purposes of this title.”156 The court subsequently granted Chevron 
deference to the ITC, finding that it interpreted its own statute, § 337, 
and not the Patent Act.157 
Kinik generated immense backlash, leading to hearings in 2007 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Georgetown law professor John 
Thomas testified that the ITC interprets the Patent Act whenever it 
makes patent-related determinations.158 He noted the “numerous 
complications that arise from varying enforcement possibilities between 
                                                                                                                     
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2001) (noting that with regard to parallel ITC/federal court patent litigation, 
“permitting parallel proceedings involving identical fact patterns applying identical law permits 
parties to engage in forum shopping”). Note, however, that Kali Murray argues that this type of 
divergence in patent law is actually beneficial, because the ITC can offer an alternative 
perspective on patent law that ultimately improves patent jurisprudence. See Kali N. Murray, 
The Cooperation of Many Minds: Domestic Patent Reform in a Heterogeneous Regime, 48 
IDEA 289, 301 (2008). 
 150. In re Abrasive Products Made Using a Process for Making Powder Preforms, USITC 
Inv. No. 337-TA-449, 2002 WL 480986 (Feb. 8, 2002), aff’d sub nom, Kinik Co. v. U.S. Int’l 
Trade Comm’n, 362 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 151. Abrasive Products, 2002 WL 480986.  
 152. Id. 
 153. Kinik, 362 F.3d at 1363. 
 154. Id. at 1359. 
 155. Id. at 1361. 
 156. See id. at 1362 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2006)). 
 157. Id. at 1363. 
 158. See 2007 Senate Hearings, supra note 144, at 85 (statement of John R. Thomas, 
Professor of Law, Georgetown University); see also Rogers & Whitlock, supra note 59, at 471 
(stating that in § 337 cases, the ITC applies “the same substantive patent law as a federal district 
court would”); Eden, supra note 144, ¶ 12. 
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the ITC and the federal district courts.”159 
Other commentators contended that Kinik correctly supported the 
proposition that the ITC has independent jurisdiction. University of 
Richmond law professor Christopher Cotropia argued that while district 
courts are charged with enforcing patents via the Patent Act, the ITC, 
under the Tariff Act, polices trade-related activities and protects 
domestic industries.160 Thus, as American Intellectual Property Law 
Association director Michael Kirk noted: “Section 337 proceedings in 
the ITC have a separate statutory basis from patent infringement actions 
brought in federal court.”161 Unlike general patent proceedings, they 
“are intended to protect domestic industries and the public interest.”162 
Consequently, it is not inconsistent for a defense in district court patent 
litigation to not apply in the ITC.163 
2.  Amgen v. ITC 
What little light Kinik shed on the relationship between the Patent 
Act and § 337 was extinguished by the Federal Circuit’s decision in 
Amgen v. International Trade Commission.164 This case involved the 35 
U.S.C. § 271(e)165 safe harbor, which allows companies to infringe 
some gene technology patents for the purposes of drug development and 
obtaining drug approval.166 Writing for the majority, Judge Newman 
found that § 271(e) does apply to imported products that violate a 
process patent in § 337 proceedings.167 The majority brushed aside its 
reasoning in Kinik168 and focused its analysis on two cases where the 
                                                                                                                     
 159. 2007 Senate Hearings, upra note 144, at 87 (statement of John R. Thomas, Professor 
of Law, Georgetown University). 
 160. See id. at 44 (written statement of Christopher Cotropia, Associate Professor of Law, 
University of Richmond Law School). 
 161. Id. at 78 (statement of Michael K. Kirk, Executive Director, American Intellectual 
Property Law Association). 
 162. Id. 
 163. See id. at 44 (written statement of Christopher Cotropia, Associate Professor of Law, 
University of Richmond Law School) (“There are, however, reasons not to label these as truly 
‘inconsistent’ judgments. . . . District courts pursuant to Title 35 are tasked with the specific 
mandate to enforce patent protections, while the ITC under Title 19 is meant to police trade-
related activities and protect domestic industries.”); id. at 78 (statement of Michael K. Kirk, 
Executive Director, AIPLA) (“Because ITC and federal court actions have different purposes 
and involve different remedies, there is nothing inconsistent with Congress’s decision, in 
passing the [Process Patent Amendments Act], not to extend the two specific, newly-created 
defenses to infringement under Section 271(g) to the preexisting requirements for Section 337 
proceedings in the ITC.”). 
 164. No. 2007-1014, 2009 WL 1151856, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 30, 2009). 
 165. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006). 
 166. Amgen, 2009 WL 1151856, at *2. 
 167. Id. at *4. 
 168. Id. at *4. 
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Supreme Court had interpreted § 271(e) broadly.169 Although these 
cases did not involve the ITC, the Federal Circuit used the decisions to 
justify its decision that Congress intended the safe harbor to apply to 
§ 337 proceedings.170 
The Federal Circuit disregarded two textual arguments that 
disfavored the application of § 271(e) to ITC proceedings. First, Amgen 
argued that § 271(e)(1) expressly limits the safe harbor to drug 
manufacturers that import a product that infringes a U.S. patent.171 The 
provision does not address the importation of goods manufactured in 
violation of a process patent. Second, as Judge Linn noted in his 
dissent,172 § 337(a)(1)(B) “declares unlawful the importation . . . of 
articles that ‘are made, produced, processed, or mined under, or by 
means of, a process covered by the claims of a valid and enforceable 
United States patent.’”173 As Judge Linn concluded, under the plain 
language of the provision, exclusion orders should be available 
regardless of whether infringement occurred.174  
In his dissent, Judge Linn accused the majority of disregarding the 
statutory text and legislative history of § 271(e) in order to harmonize 
the Tariff Act with the Patent Act.175 He noted that the scope of the 
Patent Act and § 337 for imported goods made by a process patent has 
differed for nearly seventy years and that importation of such goods was 
not infringement until Congress passed the 1988 Process Patent 
Amendment Act.176 
The Kinik and Amgen decisions illustrate the high degree of 
uncertainty in § 337 patent proceedings. The limits of a patent in the 
ITC are unknown, because the ITC and Federal Circuit have taken a 
piecemeal approach to determining which parts of the Patent Act apply. 
Such clarification, moreover, takes years. The Federal Circuit handed 
down the Amgen decision twenty-five years after Congress added 
§ 271(e) to the Patent Act;177 the court decided Kinik sixteen years after 
                                                                                                                     
 169. See id. (“[Section] 271(e)(1)’s exemption from infringement extends to all uses of 
patented inventions that are reasonably related to the development and submission of any 
information under the [Food Drug and Cosmetic Act].” (quoting Merck KGaA v. Integra 
Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005))); id. (“[A]lthough the statute mentions only 
drugs and veterinary products[,] the Court stated that ‘[t]he phrase “patented invention” in 
§ 271(e)(1) is defined to include all inventions, not drug-related inventions alone.’” (third 
alteration in original) (quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665 (1990))). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at *2; see 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(1) (2006). 
 172. Id. at *8 (Linn, J., dissenting). 
 173. Id. (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii)). 
 174. Id.  
 175. Id. at *8–9. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Section 271(e) was added to the Patent Act under the Drug Price Competition and 
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Congress passed the Process Patent Amendments Act.178 This 
uncertainty can raise the cost of developing new products and hinder 
licensing.179 
3.  Applicable Defenses 
The Kinik decision also highlights divergence between defenses 
available in federal district court versus the ITC. Under § 337(c), “[a]ll 
legal and equitable defenses may be presented in all cases.”180 Prior to 
Kinik, it was generally assumed that this language meant that the ITC 
must accept all valid patent defenses in patent infringement cases. But 
the ITC and the Kinik court found that at least two Patent Act defenses 
are not available in § 337 litigation. A product made by a patented 
process is not deemed infringing in federal court if the product “is 
materially changed by subsequent processes” or if it “becomes a trivial 
and nonessential component of another product.”181 Such a product is, 
however, infringing in the ITC. This disparity raises the question 
whether other defenses are unavailable as well. 
One possible interpretation of § 337(c) is that the phrase “may be 
presented”182 grants the ITC the right to hear defenses, but leaves the 
agency with latitude to determine which defenses it accepts. The ITC’s 
predecessor, the Tariff Commission, was not permitted to consider 
patent validity defenses. According to the 1974 House Report, the ITC 
was given the authority “to take into consideration such legal defenses 
and to make findings thereon for the purposes of determining whether 
section 337 is being violated.”183 But this position is not supported by 
the court’s decision in Vastframe Camera, Ltd. v. International Trade 
Commission.184 The court held that the phrase “all cases” encompasses 
                                                                                                                     
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration 
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 202, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (1984). 
 178. The Process Patent Amendments Act was passed in 1988, as part of the Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. 
L. 100-418, tit. IX, subtitle A, 102 Stat. 1107, 1563 (1988). 
 179. See, e.g., Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent 
Litigation: The Time is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 175, 175 (2001) (arguing that patent uncertainty makes it difficult for lawyers to 
effectively litigate patent cases); Willard K. Tom & Alexis J. Gilman, U.S. and E.C. Antitrust 
Approaches to Patent Uncertainty, 34 LAW &  POL’Y INT’ L BUS. 859, 890 (2003) (“Since people 
make decisions (e.g. to invest in research and development, license a patent, or settle a case) in 
anticipation of how the law will treat their conduct, uncertainty about how the law will be 
applied may adversely affect those decisions to the extent people are risk averse.”). 
 180. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (2006). 
 181. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g). 
 182. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c). 
 183. H.R. REP. NO. 93-571, at 78 (1974). 
 184. 386 F.3d 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  
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investigations under § 337(b)185 and noted that “[t]he necessary 
result . . . is that participants in a proceeding under [§ 337(b)] must be 
permitted to raise all defenses.”186 This implies that § 337(c) provides a 
right to the respondent, rather than discretion to the ITC. 
These cases fail to clarify the meaning of “all legal and equitable 
defenses” under § 337(c).187 Kinik and Amgen, together, imply that 
unless Congress says otherwise, the ITC must allow all patent defenses. 
But Amgen also shows that the ITC exercises immense discretion in 
determining Congress’s intent, which causes uncertainty regarding 
defenses. Kinik, Vastframe Camera, and Amgen highlight the need for 
Congress to clarify the relationship between the Patent Act and § 337. 
4.  Applying the Patent Act to § 337 Patent Proceedings 
Congress should clarify that the Patent Act applies, in its entirety, to 
§ 337 patent proceedings. If Congress did so, it would alleviate 
confusion whenever the Patent Act is amended. More specifically, 
Congress should amend § 337(a)(1)(B) to declare unlawful: 
(B) The importation into the United States, the sale for 
importation, or the sale within the United States after 
importation by the owner, importer, or consignee, of 
articles that, in violation of title 35, United States Code— 
(i) infringe a valid and enforceable United States patent; or 
(ii) are made by a process covered by the claims of a valid 
and enforceable United States patent. 
The part of § 337(a)(1)(B)(i) that pertains to copyright law would be 
moved to a separate subsection. 
The proposed change would have a number of benefits. It would 
ensure that the ITC applies the same law as federal courts in deciding 
patent issues, thereby reducing uncertainty in ITC litigation and 
lessening the opportunity for patent holders to forum shop or engage in 
other strategic behavior. If the importation of a product does not violate 
the Patent Act because it fell under the § 271(e) safe harbor or a 
§ 271(g) defense, then the patent holder will not be able to obtain an 
exclusion order against the product in the ITC. 
Binding the ITC to the Patent Act raises the issue of whether 
imported infringing goods should be treated differently in the ITC to 
protect U.S. companies. As Judge Linn notes in his Amgen dissent, the 
scope of Title 35 and § 337 differed for imported goods for nearly 
                                                                                                                     
 185. Id. at 1115. 
 186. Id. 
 187. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c). 
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seventy years.188 The view that imported infringing goods should be 
treated more harshly than domestically produced infringing goods is 
consistent with Congress’s intent in 1974 in allowing the ITC to 
interpret patents for its own purpose.  
But unequal treatment of imported versus domestic infringing goods 
no longer makes sense. A significant percentage of ITC actions are 
brought against domestic companies, blurring the distinction between 
ITC and federal court patent actions. Consequently, a different standard 
for patent infringement in the ITC can harm domestic companies as 
much as it can help them. 
B.  Administrative Estoppel 
The Supreme Court has “long favored application of the common-
law doctrines of collateral estoppel (as to issues) and res judicata (as to 
claims)” to final determinations made by administrative agencies.189 In 
Astoria Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Solimino, the Court 
stated:  
Such repose is justified on the sound and obvious principle 
of judicial policy that a losing litigant deserves no rematch 
after a defeat fairly suffered, in adversarial proceedings, on 
an issue identical in substance to the one he subsequently 
seeks to raise. To hold otherwise would, as a general 
matter, impose unjustifiably upon those who have already 
shouldered their burdens, and drain the resources of an 
adjudicatory system with disputes resisting resolution.190 
Federal court decisions bind the ITC.191 For example, during one 
ITC investigation, the ALJ issued an initial determination finding no 
infringement of the patent holder’s patent.192 Before the Commission 
reviewed the decision, however, a district court ruled that one of the 
patents at issue in the ITC proceeding was invalid.193 The ITC 
consequently found the patent invalid based on collateral estoppel.194 
 
                                                                                                                     
 188. Amgen, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, No. 2007-1014, 2009 WL 1151856, at *8 
(Fed. Cir. Apr. 30, 2009) (Linn, J., dissenting). 
 189. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 107 (1991). 
 190. Id. at 107–08 (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979)). 
 191. See Young Eng’rs, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 721 F.2d 1305, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 
1983) (holding that the doctrine of res judicata applies to an ITC proceeding that follows a 
district court decision). 
 192. In re EPROM, EEPROM, Flash Memory, and Flash Microcontroller Semiconductor 
Devices, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-395, 1998 ITC LEXIS 371, at *2–3 (July 9, 1998). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
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But ITC determinations of patent issues are not given preclusive 
effect by federal courts.195 This position rests on two grounds. First, the 
Federal Circuit maintains that federal district courts have original and 
exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1338, and 
that the ITC’s authority under § 337 is limited to investigating unfair 
practices in import trade.196 Second, the legislative history for the Trade 
Act of 1974 states that ITC decisions are not entitled to preclusive 
effect.197 In the Senate Report, Congress stated:  
[I]n patent-based cases, the Commission considers, for its 
own purposes under section 337, the status of imports with 
respect to the claims of U.S. patents. The Commission’s 
findings neither purport to be, nor can they be, regarded as 
binding interpretations of the U.S. patent laws in particular 
factual contexts. Therefore, it seems clear that any 
disposition of a Commission action by a Federal Court 
should not have a res judicata or collateral estoppel effect 
in cases before such courts.198 
This position made sense in 1974, because at that time, the ITC heard 
few patent cases and had little expertise in the area.199 
Stranger still, Federal Circuit decisions reviewing ITC proceedings 
do not bind future district court proceedings. Citing the legislative 
history quoted above, the court in Tandon Corp. v. International Trade 
Commission200 stated that its “appellate treatment of decisions of the 
Commission does not estop fresh consideration by other tribunals.”201 
At least one commentator has questioned whether Tandon is still good 
law.202 
                                                                                                                     
 195. See Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(holding that a prior ITC decision does not bind a subsequent federal court under the doctrine of 
claim preclusion); Texas Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 851 F.2d 342, 344 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988) (“[T]his court has stated that the ITC’s determinations regarding patent issues should 
be given no res judicata or collateral estoppel effect . . . .”). 
 196. See Bio-Tech. Gen., 80 F.3d at 1564.  
 197. Id.; see also Tandon Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 831 F.2d 1017, 1019 (Fed. 
Cir. 1987) (holding that the Federal Circuit’s appellate treatment of ITC decisions “does not 
estop fresh consideration by other tribunals”). 
 198. S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 196 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186, 7329. 
 199. Another argument is that the creation of the Federal Circuit rendered the 1974 
language moot and that there is implied Congressional intent “to provide uniform interpretation 
of the patent laws and prevent forum shopping in patent cases.” Order No. 3, In re Apparatus for 
Disintegration of Urinary Calculi, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-221, 1985 WL 303900 (June 6, 
1985). However, this argument is weak because the legislative history behind the creation of the 
Federal Circuit gives no indication that Congress intended to change the treatment of ITC 
proceedings. 
 200. 831 F.2d 1017 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 201. Id. at 1019 (citing Lannom Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 799 F.2d 1572, 
1577–78 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
 202. Terril G. Lewis, Collateral Estoppel as Applied to the Construction of Patent Claims 
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Res judicata for § 337 decisions does not make sense, given that 
cash damages are unavailable in the ITC.203 But Congress’s rationale 
for denying collateral estoppel effect to ITC decisions is no longer 
valid, given that patent cases comprise a substantial portion of the 
agency’s docket. Consequently, Congress should revise the provision to 
explicitly grant collateral estoppel effect to ITC proceedings. 
1.  Res Judicata 
The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, states that “a party 
must raise in a single lawsuit all the grounds of recovery arising from a 
single transaction or series of transactions that can be brought 
together.”204 According to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, the 
doctrine is based on the assumption that the jurisdiction of the original 
judgment did not bar the litigant from presenting “in one action the 
entire claim including any theories of recovery or demands for relief 
that might have been available to him under applicable law.”205  
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments notes that when “formal 
barriers” prevent a litigant from presenting the entire claim, “it is unfair 
to preclude him from a second action” where the rest of the claim may 
be presented.206 Thus, it is unsurprising that federal courts do not apply 
res judicata to ITC proceedings. As the Federal Circuit has pointed out, 
the ITC offers exclusion orders, and not cash damages, for patent 
infringement.207 Given the different forms of relief, the application of 
res judicata is not appropriate. 
The ITC, however, is obligated to give res judicata effect to district 
court decisions.208 The Federal Circuit has taken a “pragmatic 
approach,” arguing that if a patent owner unsuccessfully attacked an 
alleged infringer for the same acts in a prior court proceeding, the patent 
                                                                                                                     
(Part I), 83 J. PAT. &  TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 851, 877 (noting that after Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996), “it seems that the renewed emphasis on the stare decisis 
effect of a Federal Circuit claim construction will bind all lower tribunals regardless of whether 
collateral estoppel is appropriate, making the holding of Tandon moot in this context” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 203. See ITC FAQ, supra note 17, at 22. 
 204. Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, 80 F.3d at 1553, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(quotations omitted). 
 205. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(1)(c) cmt. c (1982)). 
 206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(1)(c) cmt. c (1982). 
 207. See Bio-Tech. Gen., 80 F.3d at 1564 (holding that a prior ITC decision concerning 
patent infringement or validity “cannot have claim preclusive effect in the district court”). 
 208. See id. at 1564 n.9 (citing Young Eng’rs, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 721 F.2d 
1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); see also In re Princo Corp., 478 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(“The district court’s proceedings also potentially have a direct effect on the Commission’s 
investigation because the district court’s decision on infringement might be entitled to collateral 
estoppel effect in the Commission proceedings.”). 
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holder should not be given the opportunity to do so again in the ITC.209 
Nevertheless, this doctrine rarely comes into play in ITC proceedings. 
Patent holders can avoid res judicata by filing in the ITC first, or by 
filing an ITC action with the district court action so that the federal 
court decision does not issue prior to the ITC final determination. 
2.  Collateral Estoppel 
Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, also known as issue 
preclusion, “once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary 
to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a 
suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case.”210 
According to the Supreme Court, the purpose of the collateral estoppel 
is to “relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, 
conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, 
encourage reliance on adjudication.”211 Collateral estoppel generally 
applies if: (1) there is identity of the issues in a prior proceeding, (2) the 
issues were actually litigated, (3) the determination of the issues was 
necessary to the resulting judgment, and (4) the party defending against 
preclusion had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues.212 
Two-thirds of all ITC proceedings have an associated district court 
proceeding.213 One would expect that in the interest of consistency and 
efficiency, the collateral estoppel would apply for federal decisions that 
follow ITC proceedings and vice-versa. This arrangement would reduce 
the incentive for parties to strategically engage in dual litigation.214 
At present, however, an ITC proceeding cannot estop a district court 
proceeding. The legislative history from the 1974 Trade Act has 
prevented district courts from granting collateral estoppel effect to ITC 
decisions215 or to Federal Circuit decisions that review of ITC 
                                                                                                                     
 209. Young Eng’rs, 721 F.2d at 1315. 
 210. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 
147, 153 (1979)). 
 211. Id. 
 212. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1979); Jet, Inc. v. Sewage 
Aeration Sys., 223 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1465 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994). 
 213. See Chien, supra note 64, at 70. 
 214. It is important to note that if a patent holder takes a position in the ITC that results in a 
determination in his or her favor, the doctrine of judicial estoppel will prevent the patent holder 
from advancing a contrary position in subsequent federal litigation. See Mitchell v. 
Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 1, 6 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 215. See Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1568–69 
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that prior ITC patent actions do not lead to issue preclusion of federal 
court actions); In re Convertible Rowing Exerciser Patent Litig., 721 F. Supp. 596, 603 (D. Del. 
1989), aff’d, 903 F.2d 822 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“[T]he legislative history of the Trade Reform Act 
of 1974 provides that ITC determinations should not estop other federal courts from reviewing 
the same patent.”). 
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decisions.216 In the legislative history of the 1974 Act, Congress noted 
that it did not want ITC patent decisions to have collateral estoppel 
effect on subsequent federal court proceedings. In the 1974 House 
Report, Congress stated that the ITC is not empowered “to set aside a 
patent as being invalid or to render it unenforceable.”217 Rather, the ITC 
can merely “take into consideration such legal defenses and . . . make 
findings thereon for the purposes [sic] of determining whether section 
337 is being violated.”218 
Congress also failed to clarify the extent to which the ITC is bound 
by the Patent Act. Prongs two through four of the collateral estoppel 
test219 would generally be met in parallel litigation for patent 
infringement, where the ITC issues its decision first. Issues of claim 
interpretation, patent validity, and various defenses would need to be 
litigated for the patent holder to receive an exclusion order. The 
respondent would have a full and fair opportunity to litigate because the 
ITC engages in formal adjudication in accordance with the 
Administrative Procedure Act under § 337(c).220  
The first part of the collateral estoppel test, however, requires that 
there exist “identity of the issues in a prior proceeding.”221 Kinik 
illustrates that to some degree, Congress created a law outside the 
Patent Act to address patent issues in the ITC.222 This provision 
precludes an “identity of the issues” in dual proceedings. Indeed, an 
argument can be made that under a proper reading of § 337 and the 
Administrative Procedure Act, the ITC has independent jurisdiction 
over patent cases and is eligible for deference under Ch vron U.S.A. v. 
National Resources Defense Council.223 In transforming § 337 into a 
                                                                                                                     
 216. See Tandon Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 831 F.2d 1017, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
(“[O]ur appellate treatment of decisions of the Commission does not estop fresh consideration 
by other tribunals.”). 
 217. H.R. REP. NO. 93-571, at 78 (1974). 
 218. Id.  
 219. See supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
 220. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (2006) (“Any person adversely affected by a final determination 
of the Commission under subsection (d), (e), (f), or (g) of this section may appeal such 
determination, within 60 days after the determination becomes final, to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit for review in accordance with chapter 7 of Title 5.”). 
 Note that in order to have a “full and fair opportunity to litigate” a patent issue in the ITC, 
for estoppel purposes, a respondent in an ITC action would need the opportunity to raise all the 
defenses in the § 337 proceeding that it could in a district court action.  This could be 
accomplished by making the change to  § 337 suggested in Part V.A.4, which would make the 
Patent Act binding on ITC patent proceedings. 
 221. Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 223 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 222. See 2007 Senate Hearings, supra note 144 (written statement of Christopher Cotropia, 
Associate Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law) (arguing that “Congress 
purposively created separate and different standards for the two causes of actions” with regard 
to process patents). 
 223. See Sapna Kumar, Chevron Deference and the ITC (University of Houston Law 
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patent enforcement provision but failing to grant the ITC’s decisions 
preclusive effect, Congress did not take advantage of the vast expertise 
that the ITC has acquired in patent law. It did not realize that rendering 
patent determinations has become part of the ITC’s mandate to regulate 
trade,224 and that federal courts no longer have exclusive jurisdiction 
over all patent matters. Instead, Congress has allowed parallel 
proceedings to continue unchecked. 
3.  Granting Collateral Estoppel Effect to ITC Proceedings 
Applying the Patent Act to § 337 proceedings is not sufficient to 
reduce dual litigation because it will not prevent patent holders from 
filing a district court action when they are unhappy with an ITC 
decision. The best solution is to grant ITC actions collateral estoppel 
effect on federal courts. This change would prevent parties from gaming 
the system. It would also prevent parties from bearing the unnecessary 
cost of re-litigating patent issues.225 
By amending § 337 to make the Patent Act binding, proceedings in 
the ITC would generally meet all four requirements of the collateral 
estoppel test. But this action, alone, is not sufficient for collateral 
estoppel to apply, because the Federal Circuit denies issue preclusion to 
the ITC based on the statements made in the House and Senate Report 
for the Trade Act of 1974. It would therefore be necessary that 
Congress make an affirmative statement about the applicability of the 
collateral estoppel doctrine in its next trade bill. 
One concern is whether granting collateral estoppel to an agency 
would violate the Seventh Amendment. The right to trial by jury applies 
for certain aspects of patent infringement cases.226 If the issue of 
infringement is litigated in the ITC and given preclusive effect in 
federal court, then the respondents would be denied this right to a jury 
trial. Indeed, in dicta, the Federal Circuit has stated that “allowing prior 
ITC decisions on patent infringement questions to have preclusive 
effect would potentially deprive the parties of their Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial on the issue of infringement.”227 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
Center Working Paper). 
 224. Kaisha v. Bombardier, Inc., No. SA CV 00-549, 2001 WL 1388911, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 
Mar. 9, 2001). 
 225. See Hal D. Baird, Note, Res Judicata Effect of United States International Trade 
Commission Patent Decisions, BYU J. PUB. L. 127, 138 (1992) (noting that the lack of 
preclusive effect for ITC decisions “forces parties to bear tremendous and unnecessary 
economic and administrative burdens”). 
 226. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 377 (1996). 
 227. Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1569 n.10 
(Fed. Cir. 1996). 
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It is unlikely that such a Seventh Amendment problem would arise. 
In Granfinanciera v. Nordberg,228 the Supreme Court held that 
Congress cannot assign adjudication of an existing private right to an 
administrative agency or court of equity.229 But the Court went on to 
say that “Congress may fashion causes of action that are closely 
analogous to common-law claims and place them beyond the ambit of 
the Seventh Amendment by assigning their resolution to a forum in 
which jury trials are unavailable.”230  
Granfinanceria, however, does not address whether a properly made 
determination from an agency or court of equity can bind a subsequent 
legal proceeding. In Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,231 the Supreme 
Court held that “an equitable determination can have collateral-estoppel 
effect in a subsequent legal action and that this estoppel does not violate 
the Seventh Amendment.”232 The Fourth Circuit, in an unpublished 
decision, applied Parklane Hosiery and found no Seventh Amendment 
problems for giving preclusive effect to an ITC trademark decision.233 
The court noted that after an ITC investigation begins, a concerned 
party can always seek expedited proceedings in a district court and 
assert its right to jury trial claim prior to the ITC’s initial 
determination.234 Likewise, in an unpublished Tenth Circuit decision, 
the court held that applying res judicata to a state agency decision did 
not violate the right to trial by jury.235  
These decisions are consistent with the Parklane Court’s 
interpretation of the Seventh Amendment: 
The Amendment did not bind the federal courts to the exact 
procedural incidents or details of jury trial according to the 
common law in 1791, any more than it tied them to the 
common-law system of pleading or the specific rules of 
evidence then prevailing. Nor were ‘the rules of the 
common law’ then prevalent, including those relating to the 
procedure by which the judge regulated the jury’s role on 
                                                                                                                     
 228. 492 U.S. 33 (1989).  
 229. Id. at 51–52 (citing Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 457–58 (1977)). 
 230. Id. at 52. 
 231. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).  
 232. Id. at 335–36 (citing Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 334 (1966)). 
 233. Baltimore Luggage Co. v. Samsonite Corp., No. 91-2171, 1992 WL 296368, at *4 
(4th Cir. Oct. 16, 1992). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Slavens v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, No. 91-8074, 1993 WL 307906, at *4 (10th Cir. 
Aug. 13, 1993) (citing Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 337); see also Consolidated Express, Inc. 
v. N.Y. Shipping Ass’n, 641 F.2d 90, 95 (3d Cir. 1981) (“The defendants object that if the final 
hearing in this case is delayed while the [National Labor Relations] Board proceeding goes 
forward they may, if the Board’s decision is adverse, be deprived of trial by jury on some issues 
by virtue of collateral estoppel. That is true, but it is nothing of which defendants can 
complain.” (citing Parklane Hoisery, 439 U.S. at 333–37)). 
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questions of fact, crystallized in a fixed and immutable 
system . . . .236  
The Seventh Amendment was instead “designed to preserve the 
basic institution of jury trial in only its most fundamental elements, not 
the great mass of procedural forms and details, varying even then so 
widely among common-law jurisdictions.”237 Federal courts granting 
collateral estoppel effect to ITC decisions would likewise not 
undermine the basic right to trial by jury for patent infringement cases. 
It would affect only the subset of cases where jurisdiction exists in both 
the ITC and federal court, and where the plaintiff pursues dual 
litigation. 
Another argument could be made that granting collateral estoppel 
effect to patent decisions would violate the district court’s exclusive and 
original jurisdiction over patent cases. But this contention is not correct. 
The language of 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006) reads: “The district courts 
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act 
of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and 
trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the 
states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases.” If federal 
courts are required to grant preclusive effect to ITC patent decisions, 
this requirement will not alter the original jurisdiction of the courts. 
Case law for trademark decisions in the ITC have permitted preclusion, 
finding no issue with the first sentence of § 1338(a).238 The second 
sentence merely prohibits state courts from hearing patent cases.239 The 
ITC, as an agency, is clearly not affected. 
VI.   EXCLUSION ORDERS 
Exclusion orders are the primary reason that parties choose to 
litigate in the ITC. Unlike injunctions in federal court, which proscribe 
the conduct of the infringer, exclusion orders direct U.S. Customs to 
seize infringing goods at the border.240 This remedy is by no means 
perfect. If the ITC issues a limited exclusion order, it directs Customs to 
seize only goods which bear certain serial numbers. An infringer can 
stay one step ahead of Customs and the ITC by creating new lines of 
                                                                                                                     
 236. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 336–37 (quoting Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 
372, 390–91) (1943)). 
 237. Id. at 337 (quoting Galloway, 319 U.S. at 392). 
 238. See Order No. 3, In re Apparatus for Disintegration of Urinary Calculi, USITC Inv. 
No. 337-TA-221, 1985 WL 303900 (June 6, 1985). 
 239. See id. (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006) “alone need not be construed as 
depriving the Commission’s decisions of res judicata effect since the ITC is not a state court”).  
 240. See Yingbin-Nature (Guangdong) Wood Industry Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 
535 F.3d 1322, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Blakeslee, supra note 48 at 252. 
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infringing goods.241 Nevertheless, exclusion orders provide patent 
holders with a mechanism for dealing with infringers that is more 
efficient than suing once infringing goods enter the marketplace. 
Injunctive relief in federal court, moreover, is difficult to obtain. In 
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,242 the Supreme Court held that to 
obtain permanent injunctive relief, a patent holder must show:  
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that 
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are 
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, 
considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff 
and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that 
the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent 
injunction.243  
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, joined by three other justices, states 
that “the nature of the patent being enforced and the economic function 
of the patent holder present considerations quite unlike earlier cases.”244 
The concurrence further notes:  
When the patented invention is but a small component of 
the product the companies seek to produce and the threat of 
an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in 
negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to 
compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not 
serve the public interest.245 
The ITC issues injunctive relief, in the form of exclusion orders, 
under a more relaxed standard than in eBay. Although the ITC may 
deny exclusion orders or narrow their scope to avoid harm to the public 
welfare,246 the ITC instead issues them whenever there is a finding of 
infringement, and it downplays policy concerns when determining their 
scope. The rationale for this approach, in part, is the assumption that the 
strong enforcement of patent rights through injunctive relief promotes 
innovation. But the ITC overlooks the direct harm that an exclusion 
order can cause to competitors and consumers.  
The ITC’s application of § 337 is far from ideal, but nevertheless, 
the greater problem lies with Congress. Section 337 fails to specify 
                                                                                                                     
 241. For a discussion of how companies can redesign goods to comply with ITC exclusion 
orders, see Steven E. Adkins & John Evans, Several Healthy Steps Away: New & Improved 
Products in Section 337 Investigations, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 309 (2009). 
 242. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 243. Id. at 391. 
 244. Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 245. Id. at 396–97. 
 246. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (2006). 
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circumstances in which the ITC should not issue exclusion orders. 
Congress, moreover, provides inadequate guidance to the ITC—as well 
as to courts and the PTO—about how to promote innovation through 
the patent system. To remedy these shortcomings, Congress must 
recognize the role that the ITC is forced to play in formulating patent 
policy and take a holistic approach to promoting innovation through 
patents. 
A.  Widespread Availability 
1.  Denying Exclusion Orders on Public Policy Grounds 
If the ITC finds that an imported article infringes a patent, then the 
default presumption under § 337 is that it will award an exclusion 
order.247 However, if “after considering the effect of such exclusion 
upon the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United 
States economy, the production of like or directly competitive articles in 
the United States, and United States consumers,” the ITC can deny an 
exclusion order.248 The Federal Circuit has held that the ITC has “broad 
discretion” in making remedy determinations under this provision.249 
The ITC addresses two issues. It first considers whether there is a 
public health and welfare interest related to the invention that could be 
negatively affected by an exclusion order.250 If so, the ITC balances 
“the damage to the patent holder’s rights against the adverse impact of 
the remedy on ‘the public health and welfare and the assurance of 
competitive conditions in the United States economy.’”251  
But in practice, denials of injunctive relief after a finding of 
infringement are extremely uncommon, having occurred in only three 
                                                                                                                     
 247. See id. 
 248. See id.; In re Baseband Processor Chips and Chipsets, Transmitter and Receiver 
(Radio) Chips, Power Control Chips, and Products Containing Same, Including Cellular 
Telephone Handsets, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-543, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621, at *284 (June 19, 
2007), rev’d in part sub nom., Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 
1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Mindful of the potentially disruptive effect on the U.S. economy that a 
broad exclusion order could have, Congress provided the Commission with the discretion not to 
impose such a broad exclusion if the Commission found that it would not be in the public 
interest.”). 
 249. Hyundai Elecs. Indus. Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 899 F.2d 1204, 1209 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990) (“‘[T]he Commission has broad discretion in selecting the form, scope, and extent of 
the remedy, and judicial review of its choice of remedy necessarily is limited.’” (quoting 
Viscofan, S.A. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 787 F.2d 544, 548 (Fed. Cir. 1986))). 
 250. See Baseband Processor Chips, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621, at *293 (Pearson, Chairman & 
Pinkert, Comm’r, dissenting) (quoting In re Inclined-Field Acceleration Tubes and Components 
Thereof, USITC Pub. 1119, Inv. No. 337-TA-67 (Dec. 1980)); S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 197 
(1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186, 7330. 
 251. Baseband Processor Chips, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621, at *293 (quoting Inclined-Field 
Acceleration, Inv. No. 337-TA-67).  
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investigations in the thirty-five year history of the ITC.252 The most 
recent instance of denial of an exclusion order was in 1984, when the 
ITC denied temporary relief on public policy grounds in In re Fluidized 
Supporting Apparatus.253 The patents at issue covered beds for burn 
victims that were both superior to any on the market and in short supply 
because the patent holder was unable to produce enough beds to meet 
demand.254  
The other two cases involved overriding patent rights in times of 
national crisis. In re Inclined-Field Acceleration Tubes was decided in 
1980, during the Cold War.255 The patent in question covered devices 
used in weapons development, for which there were no suitable 
replacements.256 The ITC, in In re Automatic Crankpin Grinders, found 
that a shortage of a patented auto part was preventing car manufacturers 
from improving fuel efficiency during the 1979 energy crisis.257 
Thus, short of a national crisis or a matter of life and death, the ITC 
will not deny an exclusion order after finding a violation of § 337. In 
contrast, post-eBay, federal district courts have denied injunctive relief 
merely because the plaintiff failed to show that it would otherwise 
suffer irreparable harm.258 This disparity has likely contributed to the 
rise in ITC litigation, and consequently, the rise in parallel litigation. 
2.  Adjusting the Scope of Exclusion Orders 
The ITC may choose to narrow an exclusion order based on public 
policy considerations or on the burden of enforcement. As a general 
matter, “[t]he Commission first determines what remedy is appropriate, 
including the scope of that remedy.”259 It then, “based on consideration 
of the statutory public interest factors, determines whether any remedy 
at all should issue.”260  
                                                                                                                     
 252. In re Foam Masking Tape, USITC Pub. 3968, Inv. No. 337-TA-528, 2007 WL 
4824257, at n.7 (Dec. 2007) (noting that the ITC “has declined to issue a remedy based on the 
public interest in only three investigations”). 
 253. USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-182/188, 1984 WL 273801 (Oct. 1984). 
 254. Id. 
 255. USITC Pub. 1119, Inv. No. 337-TA-67, 1980 WL 140675 (Dec. 1980). 
 256. Id. 
 257. USITC Pub. 1022, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, 1979 WL 61022 (Dec. 1979). 
 258. See Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d 440, 444 (D. Del. 2007) (finding that 
the plaintiff’s assertion that it would lose research opportunities, market share, and profit did not 
explain why cash damages were insufficient to justify injunctive relief). According to an 
empirical study by Chien, a prevailing patentee in the ITC has a 100% chance of being awarded 
a permanent injunction, compared to 79% in federal district court. Chien, supra note 64, at 99. 
 259. In re Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memories, Components Thereof, Products 
Containing Such Memories, and Processes for Making Such Memories, USITC Inv. No. 337-
TA-276, 1989 WL 608791 (Apr. 28, 1989). 
 260. Id.  
40
Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss3/3
2009] THE OTHER PATENT AGENCY 569 
 
No explicit statutory basis exists for narrowing an exclusion order, 
but the Federal Circuit has held that the agency “has broad discretion in 
selecting the form, scope and extent of the remedy.”261 For example, the 
ITC has exempted infringing products already on the market from an 
exclusion order.262 In another investigation, the ITC issued a general 
exclusion order for disposable cameras, but made an exemption for 
importation for personal use, to prevent problems with Customs 
enforcement.263 
The ITC most commonly tailors an exclusion order by excluding 
“downstream products”264 which incorporate the infringing product. To 
make this determination, the agency uses the multi-factor EPROMs 
balancing test, in which it considers issues including, but not limited to:  
[(1)] the value of the infringing articles compared to the 
value of the downstream products in which they are 
incorporated, [(2)] the identity of the manufacturer of the 
downstream products . . . , [(3)] the incremental value to 
complainant of the exclusion of downstream products, [(4)] 
the incremental detriment to respondents of such exclusion, 
[(5)] the burdens imposed on third parties resulting from 
exclusion of downstream products, [(6)] the availability of 
alternative downstream products which do not contain the 
infringing articles, [(7)] the likelihood that imported 
downstream products actually contain the infringing 
articles and are thereby subject to exclusion, [(8)] the 
                                                                                                                     
 261. Viscofan, S.A. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 787 F.2d 544, 548 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Note 
that Commissioners Pearson and Pinkert disagree with the majority view that “‘the statutory 
public interest factors do not really come into play in initially determining the scope of a remedy 
in a section 337 investigation,’” In re Baseband Processor Chips and Chipsets, Transmitter and 
Receiver (Radio) Chips, Power Control Chips, and Products Containing Same, Including 
Cellular Telephone Handsets, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-543, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621, at *290 
(June 19, 2007), rev’d in part sub nom., Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 
545 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Pearson, Chairman & Pinkert, Comm’r, dissenting) (quoting In 
re Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memories, Components Thereof, Products Containing 
Such Memories, and Processes for Making Such Memories, USITC Pub. 2196, Inv. No. 337-
TA-279 (Mar. 1989)). They instead find that “[t]he Commission has no authority to consider 
alternative remedies to a broad exclusion order unless it has first determined that such an order 
would not be in the public interest.” Id.  
 262. See Baseband Processor Chips, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621, at *49. 
 263. In re Lens-Fitted Film Packages, USITC Pub. 3219, Inv. No. 337-TA-406, 1999 ITC 
LEXIS 202, at * 25 (June 28, 1999).  
 264. “Downstream products” are products that incorporate the good that is at issue in the 
ITC proceeding. See Powell, et al., Current Administration of U.S. Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duty Laws: Implications for Prospective U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Talks, 1 NW J. 
INT’ L L. &  BUS. 177, 184 n.28 (1990). For example, a cellular telephone would be a downstream 
product that incorporates a baseband processor chip. See Baseband Processor Chips, 2007 ITC 
LEXIS 621, at *5. 
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opportunity for evasion of an exclusion order which does 
not include downstream products, and [(9)] the 
enforceability of an order by Customs.265  
The ITC generally considers which party each factor favors and then 
decides whether the downstream exclusion order should be granted.266 
The ITC, however, consistently favors the patent holder in this 
analysis. For example, it typically refuses to balance the financial 
benefit to the complainant of excluding downstream products against 
the harm to the respondent and the public.267 The ITC claims that such a 
comparison would reintroduce the injury requirement that Congress 
removed from § 337 in 1988.268  
In calculating the costs and benefits of downstream exclusion, 
moreover, the ITC acts under the belief that exclusion orders “spur 
innovation.”269 Even if the patent holder will not directly benefit from 
an exclusion of downstream products, the ITC assumes that the 
complainant benefits by having its patents enforced.270 In Baseband 
Processor Chips, for example, a downstream order was issued that 
prohibited the sale of cellular phones that utilized an infringing chipset. 
271 This order provided no direct financial benefit to Broadcom because 
                                                                                                                     
 265. Notice of Vacatur of Comm’n Cease & Desist Order & Issuance of Modified Cease & 
Desist Order, In re Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memories, Components Thereof, 
Products Containing Such Memories, and Processes for Making Such Memories (EPROMs), 
USITC Pub. 2196, Inv. No. 337-TA-276, 1989 WL 608791 (Apr. 28, 1989), aff’d sub nom. 
Hyundai Elecs. Indus. Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 899 F.2d 1204, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
(“This list is not exclusive; the Commission may identify and take into account any other factors 
which it believes bear on the question of whether to extend remedial exclusion to downstream 
products, and if so to what specific products.”). 
 266. See, e.g., Baseband Processor Chips, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621, at *52–209 (evaluating 
each EPROMs factor and determining which party was favored). 
 267. See id. at *103. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 476, 480 (1974)). 
 270. See id. at *103–07. Note, however, that the ITC will decline to issue a downstream 
exclusion order absent sufficient evidence that downstream products contain the infringing 
components. In re Voltage Regulators, Components Thereof and Products Containing Same, 
USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-564, 2007 ITC LEXIS 1108, at *110 (Oct. 19, 2007). 
 271. See Baseband Processor Chips, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621, at *103 n.231 (“For these 
reasons, we disagree with the analysis presented at the Commission Remedy Hearing by 
Professor Hausman, who stated that the relief to Broadcom was zero. (‘A goose egg. 
Zero. . . . We’re talking about billions of dollars lost to the public interest and zero gain 
incrementally to Broadcom.’). . . . This analysis does not take into account the value of the right 
to exclude granted by the patent right.” (quoting Hearing, Baseband Processor Chips 
(testimony of Dr. Jerry A Hausman))); ALJ Order, Baseband Processor Chips, 2006 WL 
3920334 (Oct. 10, 2006) (holding that the third EPROM factor weighs against Broadcom, and 
stating that “the record reflects no substantive evidence that Broadcom’s sales will increase if 
the downstream products are covered by the exclusion order”). 
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it was not producing competing cellular phones and created a significant 
public interest loss.272 The Commission nevertheless found that the 
intrinsic value of exclusion weighed in favor of granting the 
downstream order.273 
Similarly, the ITC often justifies exclusion orders by relying on the 
broad claim that “the public interest favors the protection of U.S. 
intellectual property rights by excluding infringing imports.”274 The ITC 
claims that denying an exclusion order would discourage investment in 
technological innovation, hurting the marketplace.275 
To support its conclusion that exclusion has intrinsic value, the ITC 
in Baseband Processor Chips looked to case law and legislative history. 
It cited a 1974 Supreme Court decision, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron 
Corp.,276 which noted that patent laws “‘promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts’ . . . by offering a right of exclusion for a 
limited period as an incentive to inventors to risk the often enormous 
costs in terms of time, research, and development.”277 It also cited the 
1987 Senate Report, which states that “[t]he importation of any 
infringing merchandise derogates from the statutory right, diminishes 
the value of the intellectual property, and thus indirectly harms the 
public interest.”278 
While patent enforcement likely does encourage innovation, the 
overuse of injunctions can be harmful to the public welfare. For 
example, Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro describe how patent holders 
can use the threat of an injunction to negotiate an artificially high 
royalty from an infringer.279 They note that this threat can “discourage 
                                                                                                                     
 272. Id. 
 273. Baseband Processor Chips, 2007 ITC LEXIS 1108, at *103–04 (June 19, 2007). 
 274. In re Laser Bar Code Scanners and Scan Engines, Components Thereof and Products 
Containing Same, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-551, 2007 ITC LEXIS 623, at *34–35 (July 14, 
2007) (citing In re Two-Handle Centerset Fausets and Escutcheons, and Components Thereof, 
USITC Pub. 3332, Inv. No. 337-TA-422, 2000 WL 1159298 (June 19, 2000)); see also In re 
Light-Emitting Diodes and Products Containing Same, USITC Pub. 3944, Inv. No. 337-TA-
512, 2007 ITC LEXIS 1454, at *38–39 (Aug. 2007) (“[C]ompetitive conditions favor protection 
of intellectual property over inexpensive copies . . . .”); In re Power Supply Controllers and 
Products Containing Same, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-541, 2006 ITC LEXIS 600, at *14–15 
(Aug. 29, 2006) (noting in its public interest evaluation that “protection of intellectual property 
is favored”).  
 275. Voltage Regulators, 2007 ITC LEXIS 1108, at *102, *116–17. 
 276. 416 U.S. 476 (1974). 
 277. Id. at 480 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8); see also Baseband Processor Chips, 
2007 ITC LEXIS 621, at *103 n.231. 
 278. Baseband Processor Chips, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621, at *103 n.231 (quoting S. REP. NO. 
100-71, at 128–29 (1987)). 
 279. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. 
REV. 1991, 1994–2010 (2007); see also John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 
85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2148–49 (2007) (suggesting that courts apply a rebuttable presumption of 
injunctive relief and either stay an injunction where appropriate or deny an injunction when it 
43
Kumar: The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the ITC
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009
572 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
 
innovation by firms that design and manufacture complex 
products . . . [and] can even lead to circumstances in which no one can 
profitably produce a product with social value.”280 
The ITC furthermore neglects the role of competition in promoting 
innovation. According to the Supreme Court: “The Patent Clause itself 
reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the 
avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any 
concomitant advance in the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”281 
As the FTC has observed, “[a] failure to strike the appropriate balance 
between competition and patent law and policy can harm 
innovation.”282 If the ITC wishes to promote innovation, it must 
consider the positive and negative effects that exclusion will have on 
competition, as § 337(d) mandates. 
In awarding exclusion orders, the ITC must determine on a case-by-
case basis whether the public will be harmed by the order. The agency’s 
speculation regarding the broader effects of strong patent enforcement 
should not override concrete evidence of harm. Even assuming there 
exists a general public benefit from the enforcement of patent rights, it 
does not follow that a specific exclusion order will promote the public 
welfare and spur innovation. 
The Federal Circuit has taken some action to reign in the ITC. 
Sixteen third-party wireless companies affected by the downstream 
exclusion order in Baseband Processor Chips joined Qualcomm in 
appealing the decision to the Federal Circuit.283 Applying a Chevron 
analysis to the ITC’s interpretation of § 337(d), the court held that the 
agency exceeded its statutory authority by issuing a limited exclusion 
order that blocked the imports of downstream manufacturers who were 
not named as respondents in Broadcom’s initial complaint.284 The court 
noted that under the provision’s plain language, limited exclusion orders 
could only be applied to parties that the ITC found were violating 
§ 337—i.e., only infringers that are named in the complaint.285 This 
decision will make future ITC litigation more difficult, as patent holders 
will have to sue more parties at the outset to obtain complete relief or 
establish that a general exclusion order is appropriate.286 
                                                                                                                     
would inflict “undue hardship” on the infringer or implicate special concerns of the public 
interest). 
 280. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 278, at 2010. 
 281. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (quoting 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)). 
 282. See FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 3. 
 283. See Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
 284. Id. at 1358. 
 285. Id. at 1356.  
 286. See Bas de Blank and Bing Cheng, Where is the ITC Going After Kyocera?, 17–24, 25 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &  HIGH TECH. L. J. (forthcoming 2009), available at 
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The ITC’s fundamental problems can only be fixed by Congress. 
The ITC’s inadequate balancing of policy considerations illustrates how 
Congress has failed to provide it with sufficient guidance. Section 337 
provides little detail regarding when exclusion orders should be denied 
and no guidance regarding when exclusion orders should be narrowed. 
Without a clear statute, the ITC must speculate regarding how it can 
promote innovation. 
3.  Incentive for Dual Litigation 
The guarantee of injunctive relief from the ITC upon a finding of 
infringement creates a strong incentive for patent holders to engage in 
dual litigation. After eBay, numerous law firms issued client alerts 
warning that litigants could no longer count on injunctive relief in 
federal court and advising that patent holders consider ITC litigation.287 
For example, the law firm Bingham McCutchen published an advisory 
declaring: 
In contrast to the uncertain availability of permanent 
injunctions in district court, in Section 337 investigations 
exclusion orders are and will continue to be the standard 
remedy for a violation of the statute. This is likely to make 
Section 337 an even more attractive alternative to district 
court litigation, either by itself or in conjunction with a 
parallel district court action.288  
Although there has been only a small drop in the rate of injunctions 
issued in federal court,289 the heavy promotion of the ITC has raised 
awareness of the availability of dual litigation. 
 
                                                                                                                     
http://www.chtlj.org/symposiums/v25/papers; Michael J. Lyons and Andrew J. Wu, Exclusion 
of Downstream Products After Kyocera: A Proposed New Framework for General Exclusion 
Orders, 10–12, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &  HIGH TECH. L. J. (forthcoming 2009), available 
at http://www.chtlj.org/symposiums/v25/papers. 
 287. See, e.g., Eric J. Fues, Implications of eBay v. MercExchange, PATENT WORLD, June 
2007, available at http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=14b0bd 
e3-79ca-4182-be7d-ba92c1b795ab; Joseph R. Heffern & Jacob A. Gantz, Outbidding the 
Supreme Court: The ITC as an Alternative Forum for Patent Infringement Injunctions Post-
eBay, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 23, 2007, at IP4, IP4, available at 
http://www.dechert.com/library/Outbidding_the_Supreme_Court_04_07.pdf; Brian Busey & 
John L. Kolakowski, ITC Section 337 Case Filings on Pace to Set Record, LEGAL UPDATES &  
NEWS (Morrison & Foerster, L.L.P.), June 2006, www.mofo.com/news/updates/files/update021 
94.html. 
 288. A Record Number of Section 337 Cases Filed at the ITC, as The Supreme Court’s 
eBay Decision Makes Section 337 an Even More Attractive Alternative Than Ever to District 
Court Litigation, supra note 63, at 4. 
 289. See Chien, supra note 64, at 98–99. 
45
Kumar: The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the ITC
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009
574 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
 
Further harm to innovation could arise if patent licensing 
companies—better known as “patent trolls”—take advantage of dual 
litigation. Due to the weakening of the domestic industry requirement, 
patent holding companies are beginning to take advantage of the ITC.290 
A company can thus meet the domestic industry requirement by 
showing that it is exploiting the patent at issue (satisfying the technical 
prong) and has made a substantial investment in licensing the patent 
(satisfying the economic prong).291  
For example, the patent licensing company St. Clair Intellectual 
Property Consultants Inc.292 filed a series of patent-related actions 
against Eastman Kodak Company in the ITC, California state court and 
U.S. District Court in Delaware.293 St. Clair ultimately obtained a 
settlement agreement.294 The eBay decision consequently gives patent 
trolls a greater incentive to pursue parallel litigation, allowing them to 
use the threat of an exclusion order as leverage for a settlement. 
B.  Reforming Exclusion Orders 
Broad exclusion orders served a valuable purpose in 1974. At that 
time, Congress needed to provide strong relief for foreign acts of unfair 
competition to acquire protectionist support for a trade liberalization 
bill. Congress gave newly-created ITC more power than its predecessor, 
but left in place safeguards to ensure § 337 protected U.S. businesses. 
Although the creation of the ITC paved the way for § 337 to be widely 
used by patent holders, Congress does not appear to have realized this 
consequence at the time. 
Now, few, if any, non-IP cases are heard by the ITC under § 337. In 
the 2006 fiscal year, for example, sixty-six of the seventy active 
                                                                                                                     
 290. For example, the ITC investigation for Order No. 9, In re Point of Sale Terminals and 
Components Thereof, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-524, 2004 WL 2341486 (Oct. 14, 2004) 
involved an “Intellectual Property holding company” named Verve, which provides “intellectual 
property-related consulting services, including patent portfolio assessment, patent donation and 
acquisition, strategic licensing, pre-issuance patent assessment and litigation support.” The 
company relied on licensing activities to fulfill the domestic industry requirement, but made 
misleading statements, leading to sanctions. See Order No. 63, In re Point of Sale Terminals and 
Components Thereof, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-524, 2007 WL 506522 (Feb. 6, 2007); Order 
No. 16, In re Point of Sale Terminals and Components Thereof, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-524, 
2004 WL 2677985 (Nov. 17, 2004).  
 291. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3) (2006). 
 292. Stuart Weinburg, After EBay Ruling, Patent Injunctions No Longer Automatic, 
MARKETWATCH, June 1, 2007, http://www.marketwatch.com/m/story/4d1ce0e8-4cb5-4d35-
b3b8-abe1c9671f20/0. 
 293. See Order No. 7, In re Digital Cameras and Components Thereof, USITC Inv. No. 
337-TA-593, 2007 WL 1794141 (May 11, 2007). 
 294. Notice of Commission Determination Not to Review an Initial Determination 
Terminating the Investigation on the Basis of a Settlement Agreement, In re Digital Cameras 
and Components Thereof, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-593, 2008 ITC LEXIS 1004 (June 9, 2008).  
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investigations had a patent infringement claim, and the remaining four 
cases involved trademark or trade secret violations.295 Given this 
backdrop, different standards for obtaining injunctive relief in federal 
court and in the ITC are unwarranted. 
The ITC claims that the differences are “reasonable in light of the 
long-standing principle that importation is treated differently than 
domestic activity.”296 But in practice, § 337 now functions as a 
domestic patent enforcement provision. Consequently, the protectionist 
principle that gave rise to § 337 is no longer relevant. Exclusion orders 
harm U.S. companies as much as foreign ones, with domestic 
respondents appearing in 87% of all ITC cases.297 Congress should 
place safeguards on these powerful remedies or consider abolishing 
§ 337. 
1.  eBay Should Not Apply to the ITC 
One possibility that commentators have suggested is to amend 
§ 337(d) to require application of the four-factor eBay test for ITC cases 
that involve patent infringement.298 This change would mitigate the 
strategic behavior of litigants, by limiting patent holders’ ability to get 
exclusion orders in the ITC. However, the first two factors of the test, 
which look at whether there is irreparable injury to the plaintiff and 
whether monetary damages are available,299 should not be applied to the 
ITC.  
The first part of the eBay test requires the patent holder to show that 
injunctive relief will cause irreparable injury.300 As discussed above, the 
Trade Act of 1974 included a similar requirement, which required 
patent holders to show that continued infringement would “destroy or 
substantially injure” a domestic industry.301 The requirement was 
considered to be easy to meet, with few parties denied relief solely on 
that ground.302 Nevertheless, Congress removed the requirement in 
1988, finding that it and other economic tests were not designed to deal 
with infringing imports.303 
                                                                                                                     
 295. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N,YEAR IN REVIEW: FISCAL YEAR 2006, supra note 10, at 14. 
 296. See In re Baseband Processor Chips and Chipsets, Transmitter and Receiver (Radio) 
Chips, Power Control Chips, and Products Containing Same, Including Cellular Telephone 
Handsets, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-543, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621, at *102 n230 (June 19, 2007), 
rev’d in part sub nom., Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 297. Chien, supra note 64, at 87–88. For ITC actions between 1995 and mid-2007, 14% of 
all cases had only foreign respondents, 15% had only domestic respondents, and 72% had both a 
foreign and domestic defendant. Id  
 298. See Hahn & Singer, supra note 60, at 489. 
 299. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
 300. Id.  
 301. See supra note 105. 
 302. See GAO REPORT, supra note 103, at 28 (“Virtually all government and private sector 
officials with whom we spoke commented that the injury requirement was extremely low.”). 
 303. S. REP. NO. 100-71, at 127–29 (1987). 
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Adding an irreparable injury requirement is problematic if 
Congress’s goal is to provide relief against infringers that operate 
beyond the reach of U.S. federal courts. One in three ITC complainants 
does not file parallel litigation in federal court.304 Such a patent holder 
could be denied relief, despite being injured. This issue arises when 
U.S. courts do not have jurisdiction over one or more of the infringers, 
making the ITC the sole forum that can award relief. Moreover, from a 
pragmatic standpoint, it seems unlikely that Congress will be willing to 
reintroduce an injury requirement, given that patent interest groups are 
opposed to such a change. 
The second part of the Bay test requires the patent holder so show 
that monetary damages or other remedies “available at law” are 
insufficient compensation.305 It is not feasible for the ITC to apply this 
test. To make such a determination, the ITC would first have to 
determine whether personal jurisdiction would exist for all of the 
respondents. This change would greatly increase the complexity and 
length of ITC proceedings, and would force the agency to make 
decisions outside its area of competence. The ITC would then need to 
determine the proper amount of cash damages and determine whether 
such an award is inadequate compensation. Patent holders could be left 
without relief if the ITC denied an exclusion order and a court 
subsequently concluded that cash damages were inappropriate. 
2.  Issuance and Scope of Exclusion Orders 
Congress should amend § 337 to articulate explicit conditions where 
an exclusion order may not be issued. The current language of the 
provision is both broad and vague, stating that the ITC will grant an 
exclusion order unless “it finds that such articles should not be excluded 
from entry” because of mitigating public interest or economic factors.306 
The ITC is never obligated to deny an exclusion order after finding 
infringement. Because ITC remedies are subject to review only for 
abuse of discretion, the Federal Circuit can do little to intervene.307 
Congress should also clarify the effect of policy concerns on setting 
the scope of exclusion orders. Section 337 is ambiguous regarding when 
the ITC can narrow the scope of a limited exclusion order and which 
factors it should take into account in doing so. The only formal tailoring 
                                                                                                                     
 304. See Chien, supra note 64, at 92–93. 
 305. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. 
 306. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2006). 
 307. Hyundai Elecs. Indus. Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 899 F.2d 1204, 1207, 1209 
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that remedy determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion and 
noting that “‘the Commission has broad discretion in selecting the form, scope, and extent of the 
remedy, and judicial review of its choice of remedy necessarily is limited’” (quoting Viscofan, 
S.A. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 787 F.2d 544, 548 (Fed. Cir. 1986))). 
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of limited exclusion orders requires the ITC to evaluate whether an 
order should include downstream products under the EPROMs test. As 
noted above, applying the EPROMs test is deferential to the patent 
holder, weighing the supposed intrinsic value of strong patent protection 
in favor of the complainant.308 
To make these changes, Congress needs to focus on the third and 
fourth factors in the eBay test. The ITC does not adequately balance 
hardships between the parties nor does it require a finding that the 
public interest will not be disserved before issuing injunctive relief. The 
ITC claims that these factors are already taken into account under 
§ 337(d),309 but in practice, such considerations have not prevented 
issuance of an exclusion order in nearly twenty-five years.310 The 
language in § 337(d) must be strengthened and clarified to be effective. 
Congress should prohibit the ITC from issuing general, limited, or 
downstream exclusion orders that would substantially harm 
technological innovation, public health and welfare, competitive 
economic conditions, or the production of competitive articles in the 
U.S. 
Congress should also prohibit issuance of general, limited, or 
downstream exclusion orders when the economic benefit of the order 
for the complainant is outweighed by the joint harm caused to the 
respondents and to the public interest. Note that incorporating an 
economic balancing factor is different from reintroducing the economic 
harm requirement. The ITC would instead balance the harm to the 
public interest and the respondents with the economic benefits to the 
complainant. The patent holder would not have to show in the 
complaint that economic harm exists. Instead, the respondents or the 
staff attorney would have to establish that the harm outweighs the 
economic benefit. 
This change would prevent the ITC from issuing exclusion orders 
where the patent holder does not derive a financial benefit. Currently, a 
company can use a § 337 action as leverage for a cash settlement or to 
hurt a competitor, even if the exclusion order is of no direct benefit to it. 
Although this change will not prevent these types of actions from 
initially being filed, it will prevent the issuance of harmful exclusion 
orders. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 308. See supra Part VI.A.2. 
 309. In re Baseband Processor Chips and Chipsets, Transmitter and Receiver (Radio) 
Chips, Power Control Chips, and Products Containing Same, Including Cellular Telephone 
Handsets, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-543, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621, at *102 n.230 (June 19, 2007), 
rev’d in part sub nom., Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340 
(Fed. Cir. 2008), (“The remaining factors, those of balance of hardships and public interest, are 
analyzed by the Commission in its EPROMs factors and public interest analysis.”). 
 310. See supra Part VI.A.1. 
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With regard to downstream orders, these suggestions would augment 
the EPROMs test. The ITC could continue to deny downstream orders 
where the agency believes public policy weighs against it. The new 
language would merely identify circumstances where the agency cannot 
issue a downstream order. 
If Congress makes these amendments to § 337, it would prevent the 
ITC from issuing exclusion orders that substantially harm the public, 
rather than making such decisions discretionary. It would also prevent 
the ITC from using innovation to justify decisions that simply favor the 
patent holder. 
C.  Promoting Uniform Innovation Policy 
Ideally, Congress should develop a uniform approach to promoting 
innovation through patent legislation. The ITC has shown that it is 
unable to adequately address public policy concerns. And although the 
Federal Circuit is in a position to do so, it has explicitly declined this 
role, stating that such considerations should be dealt with by the 
legislative branch.311 
Congress took a first step when it passed the America COMPETES 
Act in 2007.312 This legislation established a President’s Council on 
Innovation and Competitiveness, to be staffed by the Secretary or heads 
of departments for agencies involved with science and innovation.313 
The purpose of the group was to develop an agenda which included 
monitoring the implementation of public laws for promoting innovation, 
including policies related to trade.314  
But the America COMPETES Act has not been funded, calling into 
question Congress’s commitment to advancing innovation. Beyond 
funding, there is an issue of whether Congress has the institutional 
capacity to address the problem. Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai have 
proposed bypassing Congress by creating an executive branch 
innovation agency that can analyze pending agency actions and suggest 
regulatory reform.315 As the authors acknowledge, however, such an 




                                                                                                                     
 311. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 312. America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, 
Education, and Science Act, Pub. L. No. 110-69, 121 Stat. 572 (2007). 
 313. See DEBORAH D. STINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AMERICA COMPETES ACT: 
PROGRAMS, FUNDING, AND SELECTED ISSUES 45 (2008), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rp 
ts/RL34328_20080122.pdf.  
 314. 15 U.S.C. § 3718(b)(1) (2007). 
 315. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 1. 
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Given the immense challenges of crafting uniform innovation 
policy, Congress should consider addressing the immediate problems of 
uniformity in the patent system by abolishing § 337. Such a move 
would likely garner international support, but would be fiercely opposed 
by the U.S. pro-patent lobby.316 Nevertheless, this approach would be 
the most efficient way to address the wide array of problems that have 
arisen from patent litigation in the ITC. 
Section 337 hinders innovation by failing to adequately balance the 
needs of patent holders with those of competitors and the public. It 
promotes excessive litigation, incoherent patent jurisprudence, and 
strategic behavior by litigants. It furthermore does not adequately 
protect domestic industry. While one can argue that the provision 
promotes domestic interests by limiting the import of foreign goods, 
nevertheless, U.S. companies are frequently named as respondents. 
Indeed, the traditional supporters of protectionism showed little 
enthusiasm for the changes made to the statute in 1988.317 
The biggest and most unique advantage of § 337 litigation—
exclusion orders—could be brought in under the Patent Act, subject to 
the balancing requirements in eBay. Although exclusion orders would 
become available to all U.S. patent holders, regardless of the existence 
of a domestic industry, the application of the eBay test should limit their 
use. Congress could furthermore grant district courts the ability to use in 
rem jurisdiction for the limited purpose of issuing exclusion orders 
targeting parties that cannot be brought into federal court. 
This approach would eliminate the availability of fast, streamlined 
litigation. However, speed alone does not justify a two-track patent 
system. Rather, this problem highlights the shortcomings of the patent 
litigation system in its entirety, which should be addressed as a whole.  
VII.   CONCLUSION 
The ITC’s broad patent enforcement and policymaking powers 
under § 337 pose a threat to the efficacy of the patent system. 
Ambiguity surrounding the applicability of the Patent Act—coupled 
with the ITC’s lack of preclusive effect on district courts—jeopardizes 
the uniformity of the patent system. Patent holders frequently engage in 
parallel litigation and strategic behavior to maximize the value of their 
patents, placing a burden on respondents who are forced to defend 
themselves twice. This scenario, in turn, leads to inconsistent judgments 
                                                                                                                     
 316. The lack of feasibility for this solution has been pointed out by at least one scholar. 
See Michael D. Rostoker, Impairing U.S. Trade through U.S. Trade Law, 34 IDEA 169, 182 
(1994). 
 317. 1987 Senate Hearings, upra note 120, at 52, 59 (statement of Rudy Oswald, Director, 
Economic Research Department, AFL-CIO); id. at 329 (statement of John M. Greer, Vice 
President, Graphic Communications International Union). 
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between the ITC and district courts, undermining the credibility of the 
agency. 
Moreover, the current provision forces the ITC to make 
determinations of patent policy without guidance. The ITC’s 
policymaking expertise lies in trade, not in promoting the progress of 
the useful arts. Yet the agency has broad discretion to remedy patent 
infringement through exclusion orders, leading to decisions—such as 
Certain Baseband Processors318—that hurt innovation. These problems 
will worsen as the ITC’s docket grows, making it crucial that Congress 
harmonize federal and ITC patent law. 
These issues highlight a bigger problem regarding Congress’s 
regulation of the patent system. The ITC, PTO, and federal courts all 
have the power to interpret patents, and both the ITC and the courts 
have the power to enforce them. Yet Congress treats the ITC as an 
afterthought in the patent system, and not as a powerful agency whose 
actions have far-reaching effects. Congress needs to take a 
comprehensive approach to promoting innovation. Neglecting any one 
of the above entities—as Congress has repeatedly done—will lead to 
strategic behavior by patent holders and ultimately will hinder the 
technological progress that society depends on. 
If Congress cannot undertake this reform, then it should abolish 
§ 337. Congress could then amend the Patent Act to add exclusion 
orders as a remedy. Although such a change would make exclusion 
orders available to foreign patent holders with no domestic presence, 
district courts would be limited by eBay. The ITC would no longer be 
forced to speculate on how to promote the goals of the patent system, 
and could instead return to its intended purpose of protecting U.S. 
companies. 
                                                                                                                     
 318. See Part VI.A. 
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